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Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure: Alice in Wonderland Meets the
Constitution
David Rossman∗
Without recognizing that it has done so, the Supreme Court has created a category of
constitutional rules of criminal procedure that are all in a peculiar format, conditional
rules. A conditional rule depends on some future event to determine whether one has
failed to honor it. In a wide variety of contexts, if a police officer, prosecutor, judge or
defense attorney does something that the Constitution regulates, one cannot determine if
the constitutional rule has been violated or not until some point in the future.
The Court has used three methods to create these rules. One looks to prejudice, and
requires an evaluation at the end of the trial process to see if what happened had an
adverse effect on the result. Another method creates rules that depend on the reaction of
someone else, typically the defendant, to trigger the violation. The last way the Court has
created conditional rules is to aggregate the time frame in which to make a judgment
about the legitimacy of the actor’s behavior, so that it must await further behavior by the
same actor or someone exercising governmental power toward the same end.
These rules superficially resemble applications of the harmless error doctrine or
examples of waivers of rights, but they differ in fundamental ways. They are far less
protective of the rights of defendants and they send a much different message about the
limits of government power to those who control the criminal justice system. They create
confusion, fail to guide the behavior of the government actors whose power the
Constitution limits, stand as barriers to institutional efforts at ex ante prevention, mislead
the public about the scope of their rights, and often do not take into account any of the
symbolic values that lay behind the provisions of the Constitution governing the state’s
power to use a criminal sanction.
"Sentence first -- verdict afterwards." Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,
in The Illustrated Lewis Carroll 99 (Roy Gasson ed., 1978).

I. The Quiz
If you are reading this article, it is a fair assumption that you are familiar, at least in a
general way, with the basic constitutional rules that govern the criminal process in the
United States. You know that the privilege against self incrimination prevents the
prosecutor from calling the defendant in a criminal trial as a witness for the state.1
You’re acquainted with the fact that the Supreme Court used the privilege in Miranda v.
∗

Professor of Law, Boston University Law School. Invaluable assistance in completing this article came
from David Kantrowitz and Lucas Oppenheim.
1
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (“the constitutional language
in which the privilege is cast might be construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks
to call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so limited.”)
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Arizona2 as the basis for requiring police officers to warn suspects in custody of their
right to remain silent before interrogating them. And if you’re particularly well versed,
you may know that if a defendant remains silent after receiving a Miranda warning, that
Doyle v. Ohio3 prevents the prosecutor from using that fact as evidence of the
defendant’s guilt.
You are almost certainly aware that the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures and probably know that the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio4
required police officers to have reasonable suspicion that a suspect was involved in a
crime in order to detain the suspect briefly in a public setting. You know that the Sixth
Amendment not only guarantees defendants the right to be represented by an attorney but
imposes an obligation on the state to provide lawyers for the indigent.5 You surely have
some sense that the same right to counsel provision has additional implications for the
way the system implements it in practice. The prosecution, you might well believe,
cannot listen in on privileged conversations between the lawyer and his client.6 And, you
might remember that there is some quality control mechanism, the idea of effective
assistance of counsel, directed toward the competence level of a defendant’s attorney.7
You may have a vague memory from law school about the famous Brady case that
prohibits the prosecutor from hiding exculpatory evidence.8 And if Brady ever led you to
think at all about the Compulsory Process Clause, you may believe that the prosecutor
cannot prevent the defendant from having access to a potential witness.9
I am quite confident that you are familiar with the concept of the presumption of
innocence, though you may not be quite sure where in the Constitution it appears. I have
to admit, though, that it is unrealistic to expect you, the casual reader, to be aware at all of
the implication it has for the practice of requiring a defendant to appear in front of the
jury in prison clothes.10 I trust, however, that you can see the problem.

2

See 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
4
See 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
7
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
8
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9
See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.858 (1982).
10
See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
3
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The stage having been set, it is now fair to ask you to hazard a guess about whether the
examples that follow describe situations in which there is a violation of the constitutional
rule that governs in each case. And, yes, for each of these examples, there is a rule that
controls.
1. A police officer comes upon someone standing in the street and with no reason
at all to think that the person is involved in criminal activity, other than the fact
that the person is wearing a hooded sweatshirt, the officer pulls out his gun and
announces: “Don’t move.”
2. The prosecutor in a bank robbery case does not reveal to defense counsel that
an eyewitness to the crime told the police that a third person, not the defendant,
was the culprit.
3. The judge presiding over the arraignment of a defendant charged with assault
and battery, which is a misdemeanor that has a maximum sentence of two and one
half years, refuses to appoint a lawyer to represent her even though the defendant
insists she is going to take her case to trial in front of a jury.
4. After the defendant testifies on direct that he was just an innocent bystander
and not an active participant in the crime, the prosecutor asks on cross
examination: “Isn’t it true that after the police gave you a Miranda warning, you
remained silent and never told them you were an innocent bystander?”
5. A police detective gives a Miranda warning, and hears the suspect say he wants
to remain silent. Ignoring the suspect’s statements, the detective continues to
question him and elicits a confession.
6. Prior to trial, the defendant’s court appointed attorney has spoken to him for
only one half hour. In that time, the defendant did manage to tell his lawyer that
he had an alibi, and identifies the friends who would corroborate his whereabouts
at the time of the crime. The defense attorney does nothing to investigate the
alibi.
7. The judge orders a defendant brought into the courtroom for trial, in front of
the jury, knowing that the defendant is wearing distinctive prison clothes.
8. An undercover police agent is indicted as a codefendant, though the prosecutor
never intends to place him on trial, and, pretending to be on the defendant’s side,
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attends a meeting between defendant and his lawyer where they discuss trial
strategy.
9. Law enforcement authorities deport a person in their custody who was arrested
at the same time as the defendant and who was a joint venturer in the crime with
which the defendant is charged, making the person unavailable to the defense as a
witness.
You suspected some sort of trick, didn’t you? Of course, none of the examples have
obvious answers. In each and every case, the correct answer is: you cannot tell if the
relevant constitutional rule has been violated or not. In none of the examples do you
have enough information to be able to answer the question. What’s missing in each case
is something that will only happen in the future.
The reason for this, in a nutshell, is that the rule that governs each situation is a
conditional rule. There are three elements that define a conditional rule. First, there must
be some actor whose behavior is the target of the rule. Second, the actor must engage in
some predicate behavior that triggers the rule. And third, there is some future
consequence that defines a violation of the rule.
Each of the examples has an actor whose behavior is evaluated by a constitutional
rule: a judge, prosecutor, policeman or defense attorney. Each actor has engaged in the
predicate behavior that triggers the rule. But in none of the examples has the story
unfolded to allow you to determine if the consequence that defines the violation has
occurred.
The police officer in the first example may end up violating the Fourth Amendment,
but if the sweatshirted suspect shows foolhardy valor and runs away, the officer is guilty
of doing nothing more than displaying extraordinary uncivility. The prosecutor in the
second example may never reveal the troublesome eyewitness, but if the evidence she
introduces at trial is sufficiently strong, she may get in trouble with the ethics authorities
in her jurisdiction but certainly will not have violated the constitutional right of the
defendant. And the judge who refuses to appoint a lawyer for the misdemeanor
defendant facing two and one half years in jail can insulate himself from any possibility
of reversal on appeal, and probably win plaudits from the court administrator responsible
for keeping the budget in check, by sentencing the defendant to pay a fine if he is
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convicted rather than incarcerating him. As you read through the rest of this discussion,
you’ll see that you can tell a similar story about all of the others. Their behavior on its
face may not be laudable. But unless some future event unfolds in a certain way, they
will have done nothing that violates the Constitution.
The discussion that follows first explores the different methods the Court has used to
craft conditional rules. It describes them in roughly the order in which they appeared.
First came rules that incorporated prejudice, in terms of having an adverse effect on
outcome of the case, as the future consequence that defined the violation. Next are rules
that depend on the person whose interests the rule protects reacting in some way to the
predicate behavior. And last are cases in which the future consequence is some
subsequent behavior by the actor or someone else working in concert with him or her.
The next section of the discussion attempts to evaluate the phenomenon of conditional
rules from the point of view of their desirability as policy, both pragmatic and
constitutional. First it discusses the disadvantages of these types of rules. It considers
their efficacy in shaping the behavior of the actors whose behavior conditional rules
regulate. It discusses the effect conditional rules have on the ability of courts to serve as
vehicles for institutional reform of the agencies responsible for the actors the rules
regulate and the practices in which they engage. It takes account of the effect that
conditional rules have in sending misleading messages about the limits that the
Constitution places on the exercise of power in the criminal justice system. And, it
explores the problems with the special case of rules that rely on a showing of prejudice.
The discussion then turns to the reasons why one might prefer a conditional rule. The
first two are the utility of the underlying behavior and a reluctance to specify the rules
that govern the primary actors. Then it explores the pragmatic considerations, like cost
and collateral effects, that might influence a court to adopt a conditional rule. And last, it
explores whether the language of the Constitution itself, specifically the Due Process
Clause, compels the adoption fo a conditional rule.
The conclusion is followed by two appendices, one that lists all of the cases in which
the Court either discussed adopting or actually adopted a conditional rule and the other
indicating the votes of the Justices in each of those cases.
II. The Development of Conditional Rules
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A. Conditional Admission in the Law of Evidence
The concept underlying a conditional rule, that future events must unfold before one
can make a final judgment about the legitimacy of an action, is a familiar one in the law
of evidence. Common law judges often found themselves in the position of having to
rule on the admissibility of evidence in circumstances where all of the facts necessary to
establish either its relevance or competence had not yet been established. Rather than
suffering the inconvenience of requiring the party offering the evidence to prove
foundational facts out of the order which logic commended, a judge would allow the
evidence to come in de bene, or conditionally.11 If the proponent of the evidence
subsequently “brought home” or “connected up”12 the evidence, then it became part of
the proof the jury could consider. If, however, the proponent failed to come forward with
the necessary predicate for the evidence that had already been admitted, in the ordinary
course of events the judge ordered it stricken and told the jury to disregard it.13

11

See 6 Wigmore, EVIDENCE §1871 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (“Thus the fundamental rule, universally
accepted, is that with reference to facts whose relevancy depends upon others, the order of presentation is
left to he discretion of the party himself, subject of course to the general discretion of the trial court in
controlling the order of evidence.); Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. Rev. 165, 166-67 (1929) (questions of relevancy and
competence often depend on the existence of other facts); Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of
Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392, 394 n. 9 (1927) (“Judges
sometimes admit evidence conditionally or de bene subject to a motion to strike out.”)
12
See Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 323, 326 (1984).
13
See e.g., O’Brien v. Keefe, 175 Mass. 274, 279 (1900):
the possibility of testimony admitted de bene not being subsequently made competent is one of
the considerations to be passed upon by the presiding magistrate in determining whether to admit
such evidence at the time it is offered or not; and it is necessary, in the conduct of trials, that such
discretion should be exercised; if evidence admitted de bene is not subsequently made good, the
only remedy that can be given is, on the proper application being subsequently made, to rule out
the testimony. Whether, in such a case, the party, who produces the witness whose testimony has
been confused, or the party who has undertaken to assert that the witness is not to be believed
because he is a criminal, and it turns out that that assertion is unfounded, is the greater sufferer, is
open to question; if he has suffered an injury, it is one inherent in the trial of causes and it is well
settled, when such evidence is admitted in a jury trial, that the objecting party cannot be heard to
complain, if the evidence is ruled out and the jury are instructed to disregard it. Smith v. Whitman,
6 Allen, 562. Selkirk v. Cobb, 13 Gray, 313. Whitney v. Bayley, 4 Allen, 173.
See also, Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence,
40 HARV. L. REV. 392, 411 n. 65 (1927) (referring to “the time-saving device of tentatively admitting the
[evidence] subject at the close of the case to a motion to strike out,” in reference to Lord Penzance’s ruling
in Hitchens v. Eardley, L.R. 2 P. & D. 248 (1871).)

Conditional Rules

7

When a judge conditionally admits evidence in a criminal case, it can have
constitutional implications. Where an out of court statement by an absent witness is part
of the prosecution’s case, it can violate the defendant’s right under the Confrontation
Clause to deprive the defendant in this way of the right to cross examine.14 However, if
the statement was made by a co-conspirator while the conspiracy was ongoing and the
statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objective, there is a long standing
practice that allows the statement into evidence.15 The historical pedigree removes the coconspirator exception from the realm of practices prohibited by the Confrontation
Clause.16
Conspiracy cases are often by their nature quite complex. Requiring the prosecutor to
establish the existence of the conspiracy, the defendant’s involvement, and the
connection of the out of court statement with the conspiracy’s objective before allowing
the statement into evidence can be a logistical nightmare.17 Thus, early on in the
American courts’ encounters with these types of trials, judges had the leeway to allow the
statements in conditionally.18 If the prosecutor did not follow through on the necessary

14

See e.g. Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 433 n.12 (6th Cir. 1983) (violation of defendant’s Confrontation
Clause right to admit statement of co-conspirator when statement was not made in furtherance of the
conspiracy); Sanders v. Moore, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (habeas relief granted
because out of court statements offered in evidence were not made by a coconspirator during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy: “if the evidence did not satisfy the requirements of the coconspirator
exception to the rule, then there was not only an evidentiary error, there was also a violation of the right of
confrontation.”)
15
See United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460 (1827) (interpreting statements of co-conspirator as res
gestae and thus admissible against defendant); Mueller, supra note 12 at 323 (tracing the co-conspirator
exception to English treason trials in the late eighteenth century).
16
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (recognizing coconspirator’s statements as an
historically recognized exception to the hearsay rule); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)
(“the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is steeped in our jurisprudence.”); Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of a statement by a coconspirator made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy).
17
See e.g., State v. Winner, 17 Kan. 298, 305 (1876):
Ordinarily when the acts and declarations of one co-conspirator are offered in evidence as against
another co-conspirator, the conspiracy itself should first be established prima facie, and to the
satisfaction of the judge of the court trying the cause. But this cannot always be required. It cannot
well be required where the proof of the conspiracy depends upon a vast amount of circumstantial
evidence -- a vast number of isolated and independent facts.
18
See id.; Greenleaf, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, Vol. I, sec. 111 (p.127) (2nd Ed. 1844).
Sometimes, for the sake of convenience, the acts or declarations of one are admitted in evidence,
before sufficient proof is given of the conspiracy; the prosecutor undertaking to furnish such proof
in a subsequent stage of the cause. But this rests in the discretion of the Judge, and is not

Conditional Rules

8

proof concerning the conspiracy, however, the judge either had to instruct the jury to
disregard the statement or declare a mistrial.19 While the preferred practice was for the
prosecutor to establish the foundation before admitting an absent co-conspirator’s
statement,20 if it was not reasonably practicable to do so, courts universally allowed the
judge to admit the statement conditionally.21
The doctrine of conditional admission in the law of evidence differs from the type of
conditional rules that are the subject of this article in one important respect. In the
evidentiary context there is a shared expectation among all of the participants in the
process that the actor whose behavior is governed by the rule, the lawyer seeking to admit
the evidence conditionally, will bring about the future consequence necessary to
legitimize the original action. Establishing the reasonableness of this expectation, in fact,
is a necessary ingredient for the conditional admission of the evidence in the first place.22
The conditional rules that the Supreme Court has adopted in the area of constitutional
criminal procedure, on the other hand, do not proceed on this assumption at all. When
the initial action takes place, there is no obligation on the part of the actor to establish that
the future consequence legitimizing it will occur. In fact, it is often the case that the
future consequence is entirely outside of the control of the actor and as a result it would
not be reasonable, or even possible, for the actor to claim that the future event will take
place.
B. Incorporating Prejudice
One future event that can make a rule conditional is the admission of additional
evidence that renders the outcome of the trial a foregone conclusion despite the existence

permitted, except under particular and urgent circumstances; lest the Jury should be misled to infer
the fact itself of the conspiracy from the declarations of strangers.
19
See Weinstein, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 801.34[6][c] (1997).
20
See id.; Greenleaf, supra note 18.
21
See Weinstein, supra note 19, at § 801.34[6][c] [ii] (listing the rule in each federal circuit]. In Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 UY.S. 171, 176 (1987), the Court specifically declined to address the question of the
proper order of proof in establishing the foundation for the admission of an absent co-conspirator’s
statement. However, the law in every circuit allows a judge to admit the statement conditionally where it is
not reasonably practicable to require the foundation to come beforehand.
22
See 6 Wigmore, EVIDENCE §1871 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) ((“if the evidential fact thus put forward has on
its face no apparent connection with the case, an accompanying statement of the connecting facts must be
made by counsel, and a promise to introduce them at a later time if they have not already been
introduced.”)
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of the predicate action that triggered the rule. In other words, simply incorporate a
requirement of ex post prejudice in defining the rule.
For those who find that sports analogies make articles about legal doctrine more fun to
read, it is very much like the off sides rule in soccer. Players in the half of the field
closest to their opponent’s goal are penalized for being in a off sides position (when they
do not have two opposing players between them and the end line at the moment when one
of their teammates touches the ball) only if they gain some advantage by failing to stay
on sides.23 When the ball is played, the assistant referee on the sideline raises a flag to
indicate that someone is in an off sides position but subsequent events must often unfold
before the referee on the field can make a decision about whether the rule was violated
and the defending team awarded an indirect free kick.
Incorporating prejudice is the way that the Court first adopted a conditional rule and it
remains the most common technique in the Court’s conditional rules universe. The value
to which the Court has directed the prejudice inquiry considers whether there was any
affect on the defendant’s ability to convince the fact finder to return a not guilty verdict
or a more lenient sentence. It is, in order words, entirely result oriented.
i. Harmless Error and Conditional Rules
A conditional rule based on ex post prejudice sounds a lot like the doctrine of harmless
error. Contemporary appellate courts affirm convictions all the time despite the presence
of some constitutional rule violation because they determine that the error did not affect
the result of the trial.24 Both harmless error and this type of conditional rule stem from a
concern that defendants not escape convictions for “technical” rule violations that do not
affect the fundamental integrity of the process.

23

See Federation Internationale de Football Association, LAWS OF THE GAME 2005 at 34 (Law 11):
A player in an offside position is only penalised if, at the moment the
ball touches or is played by one of his team, he is, in the opinion of
the referee, involved in active play by:
• interfering with play or
• interfering with an opponent or
• gaining an advantage by being in that position
24
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d
940, 949 (8th Cir. 2005); Parsad v. Greiner, 337 F.3d 175, 185 (2nd Cir. 2003).
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The concept of harmless error came about as a reaction to the rigid rule based system
of appellate review that prevailed prior to the early decades of the twentieth century.25 In
the words of one early proponent, the doctrine was a necessary antidote to the prevailing
process of review that allowed appellate courts to “tower above the trials of criminal
cases as impregnable citadels of technicality.”26 To curb the formalistic practice of

25

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 48 (1967) ( Harlan, J. dissenting) (“The harmless-error rules
now utilized by all the States and in the federal judicial system are the product of judicial reform early in
this century. Previously most American appellate courts, concerned about the harshness of criminal
penalties, followed the rule imposed on English courts through the efforts of Baron Parke, and held that any
error of substance required a reversal of conviction.”)
The anti-formalist movement that led to the adoption of the harmless error rule on appeal also affected
the way the Court interpreted constitutional rules that applied in the trial process. Two cases bracketing the
turn of the century that dealt with the same issue display the philosophical current that underlay each
position. Both cases dealt with whether the Due Process Clause requires that before a trial can commence
the accused must first formally enter a not guilty plea.
The Court first encountered this application of due process in 1896, in Crain v. United States, 162 U.S.
625 (1896). Crain reversed a conviction because the record of the trial did not reflect the fact that the
defendant entered a not guilty plea.
It is true that the Constitution does not, in terms, declare that a person accused of crime cannot be
tried until it be demanded of him that he plead, or unless he pleads, to the indictment. But it does
forbid the deprivation of liberty without due process of law; and due process of law requires that
the accused plead, or be ordered to plead, or, in a proper case, that a plea of not guilty be filed for
him, before his trial can rightfully proceed.
Id. at 645. Refusing to draw the inescapable inference that the defendant did enter the appropriate plea
from the fact that the jury “was sworn to and tried ‘the issue joined,’” id., the Court in Crain acted on the
basis of a formalist principle, handed down through the centuries, that “safety lies in adhering to
established modes of procedure devised for the security of life and liberty.” Id. at 644. The four dissenting
Justices in Crain derided the Court’s decision as resting “upon the merest technicality,” only the second
time in the Court’s history that this pejorative appears as a label for the claim put forward by a criminal
defendant. (The first was in United States v. Staats, 49 U.S. 41, 46 (1850) (“the principle [on which the
defendant relies] is here but the merest technicality, it is difficult to perceive any ground for still giving
effect to it . . .”).
Crain did not last long as binding precedent. By 1914, the dissent’s position commanded a unanimous
Court. In Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914). the Court overruled Crain, explaining that:
Technical objections of this character were undoubtedly given much more weight formerly than
they are now. Such rulings originated in that period of English history when the accused was
entitled to few rights in the presentation of his defense, when he could not be represented by
counsel, nor heard upon his own oath, and when the punishment of offenses, even of a trivial
character, was of a severe and often of a shocking nature. Under that system the courts were
disposed to require that the technical forms and methods of procedure should be fully complied
with. But with improved methods of procedure and greater privileges to the accused, any reason
for such strict adherence to the mere formalities of trial would seem to have passed away.
Id. at 646. The Court that decided Garland evinced a sense of confidence in the overall integrity of the
process that allowed it to dispense with technical compliance with formality as a bulwark against incursions
on liberty, the same impulse that motivated the adoption of the harmless error doctrine.
26
Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power (1925) 11
A. B. A. J. 217, 222 cited at Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 n. 13 (1946).
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“record worship,”27 Congress first adopted a statute dealing with the necessity for
prejudice in overturning criminal judgments in 1872.28
The Supreme Court first dipped its toe into the pool of constitutional harmless error in
a criminal case in 1900, in Motes v. United States.29 Motes involved the conviction of six
defendants for a civil rights violation arising out of the murder of a witness in a
bootlegging case in rural Alabama. The Court reversed the conviction of five of the six
on the ground that their rights under the Confrontation Clause had been violated by the
admission into evidence of the written statement of a witness who was not available for
cross examination at the trial.30 The sixth defendant, Columbus Motes, was not so lucky.
His case was different because at trial he evidently tried to save his codefendants by
taking the stand and testifying that only two people were responsible for the murder,
himself and the missing witness.31 The Court explained why Motes was to be hoist on his
own petard:
In this evidence the jury had conclusive proof of the guilt of Columbus W. Motes
of the crime charged in the indictment. The admission of the statement of [the
witness] in evidence was, therefore, of no consequence as to him; for in his own
testimony enough was stated to require a verdict of guilty as to him, even if the
jury had disregarded [the witness’] statements altogether. We can therefore say,
upon the record before us, that the evidence furnished by [the witness’] statement
was not so materially to the prejudice of Columbus W. Motes as to justify a
reversal of the judgment as to him. It would be trifling with the administration of
the criminal law to award him a new trial because of a particular error committed

27

See R. Pound, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, at 161 (1930) (record worship is “an excessive regard for
the formal record at the expense of the case, a strict scrutiny of that record for ‘errors of law’ at the expense
of scrutiny of the case to insure the consonance of the result to the demands of substantive law.”)
28
See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1962). The original statute, 17 Stat. 198, provided:
“no indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or circuit or other court of the United
States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by
reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the
defendant.” The statute morphed in that form into Rev. Stat. § 1025, which was cited by both the majority
and dissent in Crain, supra note 25.
In 1919, Congress mandated the use of a more general harmless error doctrine. Act of February 26, 1919,
c. 48, 40 Stat. 1181. Section 269 of the Judicial Code required that:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil
or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the
court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
29
178 U.S. 458 (1900).
30
Id. at 471.
31
Id. at 474-75.
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by the trial court, when in effect he has stated under oath that he was guilty of the
charge preferred against him.32
It took some time, however, for the Supreme Court formally to recognize that the
Constitution allowed a permanent breach in the wall of automatic reversal. In the first
substantial opinion grappling with the application of the harmless error statute, Kotteakos
v. United States,33 the Court averred to the possibility that constitutional errors might be
outside the scope of the harmless error doctrine.34 But it was not until 1967, in Chapman
v. California,35 that the Court first made explicit the application of harmless error to
constitutional defects in a criminal conviction.
Chapman came to the Court from a California Supreme Court decision ruling that a
prosecutor’s comment on the fact that the defendant did not testify was, despite being a
violation of the defendant’s privilege against self incrimination, harmless error under the
state’s formulation “which forbids reversal unless ‘the court shall be of the opinion that
the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’”36 The Court concluded
that the question of what remedy a state must provide in reviewing a conviction based on
an error of constitutional magnitude was just as much a federal question as was the
standard for defining the constitutional right that the trial process disregarded in the first
place.37 After establishing its role in saying how harmless error applied in constitutional
cases, the Court for the first time rejected the claim that no constitutional error could be
harmless:
We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with
the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic
reversal of the conviction.38
32

Id. at 475-76.
328 U.S. 750 (1946).
34
Id. at 764-64:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had
but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the
departure is from a constitutional norm n19 or a specific command of Congress.
n19 Thus, when forced confessions have been received, reversals have followed although on other
evidence guilt might be taken to be clear. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404; Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597, n. 1; Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 540-542; United States
v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, dissenting opinion at 1012.
35
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
36
Id. at 20.
37
Id. at 21.
38
Id. at 22.
33
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Then the Court went on to disapprove of California’s formulation of the harmless error
test, and adopted one articulated in an earlier case, Fahy v. Connecticut,39 which
concluded, without deciding the issue, that even if a harmless error rule applied to the
erroneous admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
conviction it was reviewing still could not stand: “The question is whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.”40
Ever since Chapman, it has been commonplace to accept the notion that a deprivation
of a defendant’s constitutional rights need not invalidate a conviction. There is only a
relatively small category of errors for which the Constitution requires automatic reversal.
In making the list, the Court identified those “defect[s] affecting the framework within
which the trial proceeds,”41 so that they ‘necessarily render a trial fundamentally
unfair.”42 For constitutional errors not on this list, the Constitution allows a court to
sanction a conviction so long as it meets the appropriate harmless error test.43
There is, of course, a difference between the doctrine of harmless error and the idea
of a conditional rule. The most significant is in the audience to whom each is relevant.44

39

375 U.S. 85 (1963).
Id. at 86-87.
41
Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)
42
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986). The Court’s latest version of these “structural” errors, from
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 (2006), includes:
• the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963);
• lack of impartiality on the part of the judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927);
• the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand or petit jury, see
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986);
• denying a defendant the right to self-representation at trial, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 177-178, n. 8 (1984);
• failing to respect the right to public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, n. 9 (1984);
• giving the jury a defective instruction concerning reasonable doubt, see Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275 (1993);
• denying the defendant the right to select counsel of his own choice, see United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
43
The Chapman test applies when a conviction is reviewed on appeal. If a court is considering the validity
of a conviction in a collateral review process such as habeas corpus, the harmless error test can be more
forgiving. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1993) (on habeas review, the Constitution allows
a test that asks whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict.”).
44
There are, of course, other differences, such as which party bears the burden of proof and the effect each
has on the behavior of the actors who must obey constitutional rules. These issues are discussed in Section
III-A-iv-a.
40
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Harmless error is a constitutional mandate that directs only the behavior of judges
reviewing the validity of a conviction. It tells them when they must prevent the state
from upholding a conviction that results from a constitutionally flawed process and when
they can validate a conviction despite the state’s failure to abide by all of the
constitutional rules that govern the process. Conditional rules, on the other hand, are
directed to the primary actors in the trial process and govern the behavior that leads to a
conviction in the first place. Saying that a conviction can stand despite a harmless error
does not validate the behavior of the state actor who deprived the defendant of a
constitutional right. It simply means that the defendant will be unable to void the
conviction as a remedy. Saying that a state actor did not violate a conditional rule,
however, means that the defendant has not been deprived of anything the Constitution
promises. It not only validates the end result, if it happens to be a guilty verdict, it
validates each step in the process by which the state obtained the result.
ii. Due Process and The Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Trial
The first time the Supreme Court announced a constitutional rule in a conditional
format was in 1933, when it decided Snyder v. Massachusetts.45 Snyder did so by
incorporating an ex post prejudice evaluation into the definition of the right. The issue in
Snyder was whether Due Process required the defendant’s presence when the jury goes
on a view. A view is essentially a field trip for the jury at the start of the trial, where they
get to look at the scene of the crime. Under Massachusetts procedure, what the jury
learned on the view was part of the evidence they could consider in arriving at a verdict.46
The jury in Snyder went with the prosecutor, judge and defense attorney to the location of
the murder for which the defendant was on trial. The judge refused to let the defendant
accompany the group. However, essentially all that occurred was for the lawyers to call
the jury’s attention to various aspects of the physical surroundings. The defendant only
learned about what happened on the view after the fact.
Snyder’s lawyer in the Supreme Court was not exactly clear about where in the
Constitution he was basing his client’s claim. The Confrontation Clause was an attractive
choice, since it directly addressed the issue of a defendant’s presence in the trial process.

45
46

291 U.S. 97 (1934).
See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 125
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But since a view entails neither having witnesses make statements nor lawyers ask
questions, the Court refused to expand the reach of a defendant’s confrontation right to
the context of a view.47 What did govern the process, though, was an implication from
the right to defend oneself that the Court found in the general guarantee of due process.
“In a prosecution for a felony,” Justice Cardozo wrote, “the defendant has the privilege
under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his presence
has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against
the charge.”48
But how does one determine if a defendant’s presence is substantially related to the
opportunity to defend himself? The Court’s description of the general method was
somewhat ambiguous. The opinion states only that “the justice or injustice of that
exclusion must be determined in the light of the whole record.”49 This is certainly
consistent with the way that one would articulate a conditional rule. You would look to
the record at the end of the trial to see if the defendant’s absence from the view detracted
from his opportunity to defend himself. But it could also mean that the judge must
evaluate the whole record at the time the defendant makes the request to join the jury on
its adventure rather than waiting for the view and the trial that follows.
What the Court had in mind, however, becomes clearer by looking at the way that the
opinion justified rejecting Snyder’s claim. The Court evaluated whether it was unjust to
bar Synder from the view by examining what happened when the jury visited the scene
and at the trial proceedings that followed.50 The jury was taken to the proper place.51
They were shown features of the scene that the defendant agreed were there at the time of
the crime.52 The defendant learned everything that happened after the fact and had an
opportunity to raise an objection to any misimpression or misinformation the jury might
have received.53

Based on the way the events in Snyder unfolded after the judge made

the decision to bar the defendant’s presence, the Court was at a loss to see any
conceivable way that he could have gained even “a shred of advantage” by going on the
47

Id. at 108.
Id. at 105-06.
49
Id. at 115.
50
Id. at 103-04.
51
Id. at 103.
52
Id. at 104.
48
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view.54 Since Snyder could not show a “reasonable probability that injustice had been
done” his claim that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts violated a rule established by
the federal Constitution failed.55
Why did the Court adopt a conditional rule in Snyder? Because of the same impulse
that led, decades later, to the adoption of the harmless error doctrine. “There is danger,”
Justice Cardozo wrote, “that the criminal law will be brought into contempt -- that
discredit will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth Amendment -- if
gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by
a court of competent jurisdiction in obedience to local law, and set the guilty free.”56
What sense, one imagines the Snyder Court asking itself, would it have made to overturn
the conviction when the defendant could not possibly have suffered any ill effect from the
practice of which he complained.
The concern with not reversing a case because of a mistake that could have had no
effect on the outcome, to the modern ear, makes Snyder sound a lot like a garden variety
harmless error case. So does the textual justification that Justice Cardozo gave for why
prejudice was a necessary component of the right at issue in Snyder. He explained that
only rights that the Constitution expressly conferred “would not be overlooked as
immaterial [if] the evidence thus procured was persuasive of the defendant's guilt.”57 A
prejudice requirement was also unnecessary for a right a like the opportunity to be heard,
which though not expressly mentioned in the Constitution was “obviously

53

Id. at 118.
Id. at 108.
55
Id. at 113.
56
Id.at 122.
57
Id. at 116. This textual argument is one the Court would repeat over the years, always with as little
explanation as in Snyder for why the source of the right makes it necessary to incorporate a prejudice
requirement. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679-80 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Certainly, subsequent cases have not consistently hewed to this line. Cases based on
the Due Process Clause that have not incorporated a prejudice requirement include: Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 85-89 (1988) (denying the appointment of counsel on appeal); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
702-04 (1975) (improperly shifting of burden of proof); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973)
(lacking reciprocity in discovery); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 (1964) (no judicial determination
of voluntariness of confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (judge having a financial interest
in a criminal conviction). It is not intuitively obvious that the underlying rights involved in all of these
cases are more fundamental than the one at issue in Snyder. Of these cases, only Tumey was decided before
Snyder. Tumey, however, was mentioned only by the dissent in Snyder, see Snyder, 291 U.S. at 128 (citing
Tumey). This issue is discussed in more detail in Section III-A-iv-a.
54
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fundamental.”58 But for rights merely implied by the Due Process Clause, as was the
right to accompany the jury on a view, the Court was left with the task of making a
contextual judgment about whether the proceedings were fair, by reference to the entire
record.59 This division of rights into those that are express or fundamental and those that
are merely implied is very similar to the way the Court, decades later, bifurcated harmless
error analysis into those rights subject to its application and those so fundamental that
they constituted “structural error” which were never harmless.60
Indeed, in a case raising the question of whether the due process right involved in
Snyder is the sort of constitutional claim that is subject to harmless error analysis,
Rushen, Director, California Department of Corrections v. Spain,61 the Court cited
Snyder for the proposition that the right to be personally present was subject to harmless
error.62
The reference to Snyder as a harmless error case, however, was not quite accurate.
The language Snyder used was phrased in terms that made clear excluding the defendant
from the view did not violate his right to be personally present at all. You cannot have
harmless error without error in the first place.
The fact that Snyder failed to use the framework of harmless error but instead
incorporated prejudice into the terms of the constitutional rule was hardly surprising. In
1933 when Snyder was decided, the Supreme Court, and most everyone else, assumed
that any constitutional error required reversal.63 So if the Court felt it necessary to take
58

Id.
Id. at 117.
60
See footnote 42 supra.
61
464 U.S. 114 (1983). Spain presented the Court with a question about the consequence of the trial judge
holding an ex parte conference with a juror. Spain, on trial for several murders committed during the
course of a prison break, was a member of the Black Panther Party. During voir dire, the juror in question
said she did not particularly associate the Black Panthers with any sort of violence. Id. at 115. However,
months later during the course of trial testimony the juror recalled that she personally knew the victim of a
murder committed by a party member. The juror informed the judge, who met with her alone, to discuss
her ability to remain impartial. The constitutional basis for the defendant’s complaint in Spain about the
judge’s behavior was, as in Snyder, his right to be personally present at all critical stages of the trial, as well
as his right to the assistance of counsel. See id. at 117 n. 2. Relying on the state’s concession that the
judge’s behavior entailed an error of constitutional dimension, the Court assumed without deciding that
these two constitutional rights were in fact implicated. The Court went on, however, to hold that whatever
constitutional harm was involved in the judge’s action was harmless error.
62
Id.
63
See Fallon and Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev.
1733, 1771-72 (1991) (“A finding that an error is harmless does not, even in theory, constitute a certain
conclusion that the defendant was not prejudiced. Indeed, until early in this century, errors at trial were
59
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into account the inevitability of a conviction despite the defendant’s absence from the
view, it had to make the underlying rule conditional, since harmless error was not yet
available as a tool.64

generally treated as requiring automatic reversal, and before 1967 it was generally assumed that
constitutional errors were always prejudicial.”); Stacy & Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional
Error, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 79, 82-83 (1988) (“Until 1967 it was unclear whether constitutional errors
occurring in a criminal trial could ever be harmless.”).
In a case decided five years after Snyder, Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939), the Court gave a
sense of the type of problem for which it thought harmless error was appropriate:
Suffice it to indicate, what every student of the history behind [harmless error statute], knows, that
that Act was intended to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with the
formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict.
Id. at 294. Deprivation of a constitutional right, such as the one with which the Snyder Court grappled,
would hardly have been seen as dealing merely with a formality and miniutiae of procedure. Not until
Chapman was harmless error a viable alternative in the Supreme Court’s decision making arsenal.
That Chapman staked the flag of harmless error on virgin territory is clear from its failure to cite any
previous Supreme Court decision, most notably not even Snyder or Motes, that affirmed a conviction
despite finding that the defendant was denied a constitutional right. Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion did
cite both cases for the proposition that “errors of constitutional dimension can be harmless, ” 386 U.S. at 50
n. 3, but the majority opinion did not mention them at all.
Justice Stewart’s dissent made the point explicitly, lamenting:
In devising a harmless-error rule for violations of federal constitutional rights, both the Court and
[Justice Harlan’s] dissent proceed as if the question were one of first impression. But in a long line
of cases, involving a variety of constitutional claims in both state and federal prosecutions, this
Court has steadfastly rejected any notion that constitutional violations might be disregarded on the
ground that they were “harmless.”
Id. at 42. The cases on which he relied dealt with a long list of constitutional provisions:
• the due process right against the admission into evidence of an involuntary confession, see
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (“the argument that the error in admitting such a confession
‘was a harmless one . . . is an impermissible doctrine.’”) Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
404; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324; Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518-519; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377;
• the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76; Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55; White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59, 60;
• the due process right against participation of a judge with a financial interest in the outcome of
the case, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535;
• the due process protection against effect of pervasive negative pretrial publicity on the jury, see
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-352; cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727. See
also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-544; 562-564 (Warren, C.J., concurring); 593-594 (Harlan,
J., concurring);
• the due process protection against jury instructions containing mandatory presumptions, see
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-615;
• the doctrine that convictions resting on both a valid and constitutionally invalid basis are never
the less not legitimate, see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-368; Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292;
• and, the Sixth and FourteenthAmendments’ protection discrimination in the selection of grand
and petit jurors, see Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545.
64
Although Motes had laid the groundwork for a harmless rule some years earlier, Snyder did not rely on
Motes for the proposition that a constitutional error could be harmless. While the opinion did cite Motes, it
was not for that case’s treatment of poor Columbus as compared to his five luckier codefendants, but for
details about the application of the Confrontation Clause. See 291 U.S. at 107.
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Snyder’s legacy in the Court’s somewhat limited jurisprudence on the rule concerning
a defendant’s presence during the trial process makes clear that the basis for the decision
was the conditional nature of the rule rather than an application of the harmless error
doctrine. In fact, this was an explicit issue in a 1987 case, Kentucky v. Stincer.65 Stincer
also dealt with a defendant who was prohibited from attending a pretrial proceeding, in
his case a competency hearing for two child witnesses held outside the presence of the
jury.
In concluding that the defendant’s absence did not violate the Snyder rule, the Court
found it necessary to respond to Justice Marshall’s complaint in dissent that “the
propriety of the decision to exclude respondent from this critical stage of his trial should
not be evaluated in light of what transpired in his absence. To do so transforms the issue
from whether a due process violation has occurred into whether the violation was
harmless.”66 Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion directly answered this charge:
We do not address the question whether harmless-error analysis applies in the
situation where a defendant is excluded from a critical stage of the proceedings in
which his presence would contribute to the fairness of the proceeding. In this
case, respondent simply has failed to establish that his presence at the competency
hearing would have contributed to the fairness of the proceeding. He thus fails to
establish, as an initial matter, the presence of a constitutional deprivation.67
ii. Due Process and the Prosecutor’s Obligation to Reveal Exculpatory Evidence
The next conditional rule to make its appearance also sprung from the Due Process
Clause. As in Snyder, the complaint was not something addressed by one of the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights. It was, rather, a “free standing” due process dictate,68
this one directed to the prosecutor. It dealt with the obligation to disclose exculpatory
information to the defense. In 1985, the Court eventually cast this rule in a form that
required prosecutors to reveal exculpatory information prior to trial only if its
significance in the context of all evidence that was eventually admitted against the
defendant was so great that it would raise a reasonable probability that the defendant

65

See 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
Id. at 754 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 747.
68
See Israel, Free Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for
Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 303 (2001).
66
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would have been acquitted.69 The rule, however, did not emerge in this format fully
formed as a conditional one.
The path it took began in 1935, in Mooney v. Holohan.70 Mooney was a habeas corpus
case based on a claim that the state’s entire case rested on the prosecutor’s knowing use
of perjured testimony. This was the Court’s first occasion to find in the Due Process
Clause any constitutional rule limiting the power of a prosecutor. A unanimous Court
concluded that due process “cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing
if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but
used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of
court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.”71
Mooney did not present the Court with an occasion to consider whether to incorporate
a prejudice requirement into the definition of its new rule, since there was no factual
dispute about the habeas corpus petition’s claim that the entire prosecution case consisted
of suborned perjury. The same was true the next time the issue appeared seven years
later, in Pyle v. Kansas.72 But a case that arose in the 1950’s, Napue v. Illinois, indicated
that the Court was concerned to some degree with the effect that a prosecutor’s knowing
use of perjured testimony had on the jury’s evaluation of all the evidence.73
Napue dealt with a prosecutor who allowed a witness to lie not about what the
defendant had done, as was the case in the earlier decisions, but about something in the
witness’ background that affected his credibility. In extending the Mooney decision to
this context, the Court addressed the state’s contention that it was bound by a factual
determination in the state court that “the false testimony could not in any reasonable
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.”74 Rather than rejecting the contention
as irrelevant to the federal claim, the Court made its own examination of the record and
concluded that “the false testimony used by the State in securing the conviction of
petitioner may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.”75
69

See United State v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
See 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
71
Id. at 112.
72
See 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
73
See 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
74
Id. at 271.
75
Id. at 272. The context in which the Supreme Court was asked to decide this issue is much narrower than
the one that it subsequently adopted as part of the test for a prosecutor’s obligation to reveal exculpatory
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A standard that asks a court reviewing a conviction to determine, as Napue requires,
whether the evidence “may have had an effect on the trial” places it in exactly the same
position it occupies when it considers whether to apply the harmless error rule that was
first articulated in Chapman v. California eight years afterward: “whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.”76 For this reason, a court considering a case dealing with the prosecutor’s
knowing use of perjured testimony would never have to choose between a conditional
rule and harmless error. The process of applying the relevant legal doctrine to the facts
will always be the same.
As a result, neither Mooney nor any of its progeny interpreting the rule preventing
prosecutors from using perjured testimony ever truly cast it in conditional form. That
opportunity came, however, when the Court had to consider extending the Mooney line of
cases to situations where the prosecutor’s actions consisted of withholding evidence that
should have been revealed rather than presenting evidence that never should have come
to the attention of the jury.
The case that the Court used as a vehicle to reach this issue was Brady v. Maryland.77
Brady was tried for capital murder and sentenced to die. In the face of overwhelming
evidence, his defense attorney’s strategy was to concede his client’s culpability but argue
to the jury that they should spare him the death penalty. Brady, in fact, testified that he
and a joint venturer, Boblit, both participated in the robbery that lead to the death of the
victim but that Boblit, who was tried separately, was the actual killer.
In an effort to find information that would have bolstered this strategy, defense
counsel had requested prior to the trial the discovery of any of Boblit’s statements the
prosecution had in its possession. Several were, in fact, produced. But not until after his
conviction did Brady find out that the prosecutor withheld the only statement that Brady
would have really wanted to see, the one where Boblit admitted the homicide. In a
evidence. In Napue, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that there was no “was no constitutional
infirmity by virtue of the false statement,” because the witness subsequently admitted that he had been
promised that efforts would be made to see that he would receive a reduced sentence if he testified against
Napue. See Napue v. Illinois, 13 Ill. 2d 566, 570, 150 N.E.2d 613, 615 (1958). This makes Napue close to
a case where the question is whether the witness retracted his lie rather than one that looks at whether the
lie was sufficiently important to have affected the jury’s decision to convict.
76
See Chapman v. United States, 287 U.S. 8, 23-24 (1967).
77
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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collateral attack in state court, Brady got the death sentence vacated leaving the
underlying murder conviction intact.78
The Supreme Court’s articulation of the rule that governs situations like Brady’s left
room for an interpretation that it was a conditional one: “We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”79 The key word is “material.”
The Brady opinion gave no definition of the term. It is likely that Justice Douglas
meant it simply in its usual courtroom evidentiary sense, to connote nothing more than
evidence that is germane to the fact at issue. In this way, it serves to shed light on what
the Court meant by “evidence favorable to an accused.”
The Brady Court’s application of its rule to the facts of the case before it is also
consistent with this understanding. The Court left the underlying murder conviction
standing and affirmed the lower court’s ruling vacating the imposition of the death
penalty. In explaining this split decision, Brady accepted, as it was obliged, the state
court’s interpretation of its own law of evidence and of the elements of its substantive
crimes. Boblit’s confession was not admissible on the question of Brady’s guilt because
even if the jury accepted it as true, it would have done nothing to negate any of the
elements of first degree murder under Maryland law. It would, however, been admissible
on the question of punishment.
In this light, Brady is not exactly a conditional rule. It could simply mean that a
prosecutor has the obligation of disclosing beforehand any evidence whose character met
the terms of this evidentiary sense of materiality, without regard for the proof that was
eventually admitted at trial. The rule morphed, however, in its subsequent appearances
before the Court.
The first part of the transformation came in United States v. Agurs.80 Agurs dealt with
a slightly different scenario than Brady in terms of the interaction between the defense
and prosecution prior to the trial. Whereas Brady’s attorney had specifically asked for
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Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
80
See 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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the information that the prosecutor withheld, Augur’s lawyer did not. This difference led
the Court to adopt a different test for materiality, one that is expressly conditional.
Agurs, like Caesar, found that the territory it considered was divided into three parts.
The first, knowing use of perjury, meant that the Napue formulation applied and a
conviction “must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury.”81 This formulation is essentially a
harmless error standard that puts the burden on the prosecutor to show that the conviction
should not be overturned.82 The second, where the prosecutor ignored a request for
information specifically identifying what the defense sought, requires the prosecutor to
comply if the information is material in the sense that Brady used the term, so that “the
suppressed evidence might have affected the result of the trial.”83 The third were
situations where the defense either made no request or simply asked for exculpatory
information in broad, nonspecific terms.84
In this third category, the Court crafted a rule that required the prosecutor before trial
to evaluate how the significance of the evidence would appear in context after the trial.
“[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist,
constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated
in the context of the entire record.”85 Unlike the Brady formulation, this clearly is
conditional.
Taking this backward looking view, the prosecutor in Agurs did nothing wrong by
withholding information that the murder victim, Sewell, had several convictions for
crimes of violence, using a knife as the weapon, despite knowing that the defendant
intended to rely on a claim of self defense in the face of a knife attack by Sewell.
Knowing that the victim had a record would not, in the Justices’ minds, have created a
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Id. at 120.
See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 299 (1999) (opinion of Souter, J. concurring and dissenting) (“We
have . . . equated materiality in the perjured-testimony cases with a showing that suppression of the
evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80
(1985) (Agurs first category stated a rule “in terms that treat the knowing use of perjured testimony as error
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See id. at 108.
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reasonable doubt in light of the trial evidence revealing that the victim had been stabbed a
number of times while the defendant had no injuries at all.
Agurs did not explain in any detail why it made the rule for this category of
exculpatory information conditional. Justice Stevens pointed out that the problem of
identifying what the Constitution requires prosecutors to do arises at two different time
frames, prior to trial when the prosecutor has to decide whether to turn something over or
not and after trial when a judge has to determine if the prosecutor’s inaction at the earlier
stage violated the defendant’s right to exculpatory information.86 From there, he
concluded that logic required the rule to mean the same thing at both times.87 “[U]nless
the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial,” Agurs states, “there was no
constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and absent a constitutional
violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose.”88 But it
is not obvious why this insight into the coherence of a constitutional rule requires that the
Court adopt the post hoc vantage point rather than the ex ante.
Perhaps more significant were the brief allusions in the opinion to the difficulty the
Court foresaw a non-conditional rule would create for prosecutors. The opinion noted
how “imprecise” the standard was to identify exculpatory information and how “the
significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire
record is complete.”89 The opinion went on to bemoan the impracticality of a nonconditional rule: “If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only
way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete
discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.”90
After Agurs, into which category one placed an exculpatory evidence case made all the
difference. If defense counsel specifically requested the information, courts would apply
a less forgiving standard than when counsel made no request or just asked for Brady
material in general. However, nine years later, in United State v. Bagley, 91 the Court
abandoned its categorization scheme and made clear that there was only one rule
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governing a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence, and that it was
conditional.
Defense counsel in Bagley had requested information whether prosecution witnesses
had received any “deals, promises or inducements” to testify.92 The prosecution failed to
disclose that its two principal witnesses had entered into written agreements with federal
law enforcement authorities, literally titled a “Contract for Purchase of Information and
Payment of Lump Sum Therefor,” giving them money in return for gathering information
and testifying against the defendant.93
The Court of Appeals relied on defense counsel’s specific request as the trigger to
apply the Brady test of materiality rather than the more forgiving Agurs conditional
rule.94 Since information that these witnesses were paid informants would have been
material to the issue of the defendant’s guilt, it meant that the prosecutor had violated the
due process right of the defendant and left only the question of remedy. This, in turn,
required the court to apply the harmless error rule. Casting about for the proper
application of this doctrine, the court reasoned that what happened here could never be
harmless because it not only implicated the defendant’s right under the Due Process
Clause to receive exculpatory evidence but impaired his right under the Confrontation
Clause effectively to cross examine adverse witnesses.95 That was a violation that
Supreme Court precedent had placed outside the realm of harmless error.96 It was, in
other words, subject to automatic reversal.
The Bagley decision rejected the notion that harmless error was the lens through which
it was appropriate to consider what the prosecutor had done. Rather than maintaining a
separate regime for exculpatory evidence cases depending on whether there has been a
request or not, the Court collapsed the two categories and adopted as the formulation for
how to apply the conditional rule that now applied to both a test from Strickland v.
Washington, an ineffective assistance of counsel case:
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
92
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been different. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.97
As before, the Court did not spend a lot of effort explaining why the Constitution
required a conditional rule even when the prosecutor ignored defense counsel’s specific
request. It repeated the language from Agurs about the basis for the rule being to ensure
fundamental fairness. The opinion also claimed that any non-conditional rule would be
wildly impractical: “a rule that the prosecutor commits error by any failure to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused, no matter how insignificant, would impose an
impossible burden on the prosecutor and would undermine the interest in the finality of
judgments.”98 Taking this straw man on its face, the Court went on to comment that
placing this type of obligation on prosecutors would fundamentally alter the adversary
system, presumably a result that the Due Process Clause could not encompass.99
The Bagley Court remanded the case for the application of its newly announced
standard. A Ninth Circuit panel of three former trial judges found that the impeachment
information was so significant that it raised a reasonable probability that the result of the
trial would have been different.100 Bagley, serving a federal sentence on other charges,
was never retried.101
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iii. Due Process and the Prosecutor’s Obligation to Avoid Improper Pre-Indictment
Delay
Prosecutors control the timing of much of the process that brings defendants to justice.
They have total control over the decision whether to charge someone with a crime and
when to initiate a complaint or indictment. The Due Process Clause provides the limit on
how long a prosecutor can wait in the pre-charge stage of a case before initiating the
process that brings the defendant into court. And the governing rule that controls is
conditional. The line of cases dealing with exculpatory evidence influenced the format of
the rule the Court crafted for pre-indictment delay.
In United States v. Marion, 102 the government brought a case directly to the Court
after the trial judge dismissed the indictment on the ground that the three year delay
between the end of the defendant’s criminal behavior and the return of the grand jury’s
true bill violated the Speedy Trial Clause. The Court summarily rejected this claim on the
ground that the speedy trial rule only governed the timing of the process after a defendant
is first brought into court.103
However, that did not leave the timing of an indictment entirely unregulated. In a
brief passage in the opinion, the Court accepted the government’s concession that due
process still served as a source for preventing governmental overreaching. The resulting
test had two parts. First, a defendant had to show that the prosecutor delayed bringing
charges to gain a tactical advantage. And second, citing both Brady and Napue, the
defendant had to show that the delay “caused substantial prejudice to [his] rights to a fair
trial.”104
Because Marion had not yet been tried and had neither alleged nor proved any actual
prejudice, relying only on the generic possibility that because of the delay “memories will
dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost,”105 the Court found it easy to
clear the path for his trial. In light of the lack of any facts against which to craft a more
precise standard, the Court left the issue without further illumination.
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One can glean the conditional nature of this rule, however, by looking to statements
the Court has made in the closely related area of speedy trial law. Whereas prejudice is a
necessary component of a due process claim based on pre-indictment delay, it is only one
of the interests that the Speedy Trial Clause protects. However, in practical terms, it is
the most important and almost always the only interest at stake in speedy trial case.
What the Court said about speedy trial claims in United States v. MacDonald,106 as a
reason to reject the legitimacy of an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on lack of a speedy trial, applies as well to claims based on Marion: “a
central interest served by the [due process rule dealing with pre-indictment delay] is the
protection of the factfinding process at trial. The essence of a [Marion] claim in the usual
case is that the passage of time has frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the
crime charged. Normally, it is only after trial that that claim may fairly be assessed.”107
The necessity for a post-trial evaluation is the hallmark of a conditional rule.
iv. The Obligation of the Prosecutor Not to Impair the Sixth Amendment’s Right
to Compulsory Process
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant will have “compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.”108 From this language, one can extract a number of
specific rules that must limit what judges can do. At a minimum, a judge may not
categorically refuse to issue a subpoena for a witness the defendant wishes to call, no
matter how relevant the witness’ testimony promises to be. And, by necessary
implication a judge may not categorically refuse to allow a defense witness to testify, no
matter how central the information the witness has may be to the issue the jury must
decide. Without the ability to present a witness’ testimony, the right to require the
witness to attend the trial would be meaningless.
There must also be a rule that prevents the prosecutor from obstructing the defendant’s
efforts to bring witnesses into court. Otherwise, it would be too easy for the government
to frustrate the obligation of a judge to give the defendant the benefit of what the
Compulsory Process Clause requires. When a prosecutor contemplates action that will
make a potential defense witness unavailable, however, she only has to avoid hindering

106
107

435 U.S. 850 (1978).
See id. at 860.

Conditional Rules

29

the defendant’s access to those witnesses for whom the defendant can establish that there
was “a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the
trier of fact,”109 a standard that makes the rule conditional.
In constructing this rule, the Court, in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,110 borrowed
heavily from the exculpatory evidence cases, as well as the undue pre-indictment delay
and the speedy trial cases. Valenzuela involved a charge of transporting aliens into the
country illegally. The defendant was arrested along with three Mexican aliens after
fleeing from the car he was driving when he first came to the attention of Border Patrol
agents. All of the aliens were interviewed by federal law enforcement authorities. One
of them was held, to serve as a witness against the defendant. The other two were
deported before defense counsel had an opportunity to interview them.
The Court’s precedents on the right to compulsory process were sparse, but from them
Valenzuela could extract a principle much like the one that animated the limit that Brady
contemplated. The defendant must first establish that a witness whose testimony would
be the subject of compulsory process would have something to say that could help the
defendant on an issue material to the case against him.111 Beyond this rather minimal test,
however, the compulsory process cases could not go.
The Court, however, had a body of law from other parts of the Constitution that it
thought related because they also dealt with “the area of constitutionally guaranteed
access to evidence.”112 Thus, the Court looked to Agurs, the exculpatory evidence case,
Marion, which dealt with pre-indictment delay and Barker v. Wingo,113 a speedy trial
case. In each of these areas, Valenzuela noted, the defendant had to establish prejudice to
his ability to mount a defense in order to make out a case that the constitutional rule had
been violated.114 So it would be with compulsory process. Although the Court did not
rule out the possibility that a determination of whether the prosecutor violated the rule of
compulsory process could be made prior to trial, in practical terms it is hard to see how a
prosecutor can know at the point in the process when a decision has to be made whether
108
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to deport a potential defense witness or not whether it would violate the defendant’s
rights. “Because determinations of materiality are often best made in light of all of the
evidence adduced at trial,” then Justice Rehnquist wrote, “judges may wish to defer
ruling on motions until after the presentation of evidence.”115 Though phrased in terms
of a suggestion, in practical terms there is often no other option than to wait until after
trial to decide if a prosecutor has violated the rule. It is, for all intents and purposes,
conditional.
v. The Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel and the Defense Attorney’s
Obligation to Provide Effective Assistance
One aspect of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel is a quality
control feature. Ever since the Court’s first encounter in 1935 with the constitutional
dimension of the right to counsel in the landmark decision in Powell v. Alabama, 116 the
“Scottsboro Boys” case, it has recognized that in order to serve the function contemplated
by the Sixth Amendment, defense attorneys in criminal cases must meet a minimum
standard of competence.
This feature of the Sixth Amendment makes it unique among constitutional rules
because the actor whose behavior is subject to evaluation does not exercise state power in
any conventional way. While some defense attorneys do work for the state, as full time
public defenders, and others may take on the role of quasi-public employees by virtue of
accepting a court appointment to represent an indigent defendant, the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of what has come to be known as the effective assistance of counsel applies as
well to lawyers hired by defendants out of their own pockets.117
Nevertheless, it does make sense to talk about the Sixth Amendment as a rule that is
directed toward the behavior of even these private actors. Their behavior in conducting
the defense of their clients will determine the legitimacy of the process that the state has
initiated in its attempt to impose a criminal sanction. Certainly, if the process ends in a
conviction in which a private lawyer failed to provide effective assistance of counsel, the
government may not legitimately deprive the defendant of life, liberty or property
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consistent with the Sixth Amendment. And, even if the defendant is acquitted despite the
bumbling efforts of an incompetent lawyer, one may certainly argue that defendant failed
to receive some benefit that the Sixth Amendment incorporates. When one looks closer,
however, at the details of the rule that defines competence, one finds that the Court has
chosen a conditional format. Unless the lawyer’s incompetence in fact deprived the
defendant of a reasonable opportunity to achieve a better result, not even the most stark
incompetence violates the Sixth Amendment’s rule requiring effective assistance of
counsel.
Powell and the right to counsel cases that followed over the next fifty years in the
Supreme Court never fleshed out the test by which one could determine if a defendant
received the effective assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment required.
Strickland v. Washington118 gave the Court its first opportunity.
David Leroy Washington was appointed a lawyer to represent him in a multiple capital
murder case in a Florida state court. Against his lawyer’s advice, Washington not only
pled guilty to the murders but chose to waive a jury in the sentencing hearing that
followed the plea by a week. Defense counsel, admitting later that he was overcome at
that point in the case by a sense of hopelessness, ended his efforts to investigate the
defendant’s background.119 By way of preparation for the proceeding which would
decide his client’s fate, he only spoke to two people who could provide insight into his
background: the defendant’s wife and mother. And those he spoke to over the telephone,
not in person.120 Counsel’s performance at the sentencing hearing, which was the subject
of Washington’s claim that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel, was
perfunctory. He failed to request a presentence investigation by the probation
department, presented no evidence of his own nor did he not cross examine the witnesses
the prosecutor presented or the medical experts who testified about the victims’
injuries.121
The only sign that defense counsel was actively engaged as an advocate was his
objection to the prosecutor’s effort to introduce the record of the defendant’s prior
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criminal history, which was offered to prove that the defendant was a danger to commit
further crimes of violence.122 This piece of lawyering legerdemain he accomplished by
objecting on the ground that the document the prosecutor was trying to get the judge to
accept into evidence had not been properly certified, an accomplishment that is less
impressive than it might otherwise seem in light of the fact that as part of his argument,
defense counsel asked the judge to spare his client’s life on the ground that he had no
history of criminal activity.123
Had Washington’s attorney been more diligent in trying to discover information
which might have swayed the judge to find some reason to sentence him to life
imprisonment instead of death, he would have discovered, as did the lawyers who
represented him in federal court, a lot. At least 14 acquaintances and neighbors,
including a police officer, would have vouched for what an aberration this spree of
violence was and the financial pressure he was under at the time.124 In addition, he could
have found expert witnesses, like the two psychologists discovered by post conviction
counsel, who would have testified that at the time of the murders the defendant was
chronically depressed.125
Strickland announced a two part test by which to judge the constitutional adequacy of
a defense attorney’s efforts. One part was to evaluate counsel’s efforts, as the situation
appeared at the time in which they were undertaken, against a standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms.126 Nothing about this, so far, makes it a conditional
rule. But the second half of the test did.
In addition to showing that counsel performed unreasonably, the constitutional rule the
Court crafted requires a showing of prejudice. Justice O’Connor began her discussion of
why this is so by noting that “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
effect on the judgment,” a proposition for which she cited United States v. Morrison.127
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Morrison was an interesting choice for this purpose. It involved the Court’s review of
the dismissal of an indictment because federal law enforcement agents had contacted the
defendant after her indictment in order to persuade her to cooperate with their
investigation against a bigger fish. It appears that the DEA agents involved saw the key
to their success to be getting Ms. Morrison to jettison her attorney, whom they believed
would not have been particularly hospitable to their suggestion.128 In order to accomplish
their end, they disparaged her attorney’s merit and urged her to replace him with a public
defender whom they thought more pliant. The government, once the case reached the
Supreme Court, urged the Justices to hold that absent a showing of actual prejudice, the
actions of its agents did not even violate the Sixth Amendment. The Court, however,
assumed without deciding that what the stalwarts from the DEA did was in fact a
violation of the constitutional rule, but agreed that it need not be remedied by dismissing
the indictment since Morrison did not show prejudice of any kind.129 She had, by the
way, not only resisted the agents’ entreaties to ditch her attorney, but promptly told him
what they were up to and stood by his subsequent efforts on her behalf.
Morrison’s use of prejudice, then, is all about when you get a remedy and not about
defining the rule which sets the boundaries of acceptable behavior for government agents
in the sphere of interfering with a defendant’s relationship to her attorney. Nevertheless,
Strickland cited it as a basis for incorporating the question of prejudice into the definition
of the right.
Strickland offered a number of reasons why prejudice was necessary as a definitional
matter. Of primary importance was the Court’s view of the underlying value that the
right to effective assistance of counsel served: “The purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's
performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance under the Constitution.”130 Pragmatic concerns played a role as well.
The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney
errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney errors come
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in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as
they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to likelihood of
causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to inform
defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art,
and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even
brilliant in another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel
were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an
adverse effect on the defense.131
For the standard by which a court was to judge the defendant’s claim of prejudice,
Strickland borrowed from Agurs and Valenzuela-Bernal. The defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that the attorney’s inadequate representation adversely
affected the result of the proceeding.132 Using this standard, the Court concluded that
none of the evidence that Strickland said his trial lawyer should have developed would
have led to a sentencing profile very much different than the one which led to his
eventual death.133
vi. The Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel and the Responsibility of a Judge to
Ensure that the Defendant’s Attorney is Not Subject to a Conflict of Interest
Another part of the problem of defining competent defense counsel comes in the
context of conflict of interest. Ten years after Powell, Glasser v. United States134
established that, “the ‘assistance of counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order
requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.”135
When a defendant or a lawyer, prior to trial, objects to the appointment of an attorney
on the ground that the lawyer cannot provide unconflicted representation, the Glasser
rule requires the judge to act, either by appointing separate counsel or investigating to
ensure that the risk posed by joint representation is too remote. This rule is not
conditional. The judge can determine if requiring the defendant to be represented by the
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attorney alleged to have a conflict of interest would violate the Constitution or not at the
time that she makes the decision ruling on the facts that were brought to her attention.
But where the facts known to the judge prior to trial make it apparent that a lawyer
appointed to represent the defendant serves conflicting interests, if neither the lawyer nor
her client object the Constitution’s mandate is conditional. The failure of the judge to act
in the face of the facts available to her may, or may not, violate the rule that governs in
this situation.
This conditional rule appeared in Mickens v. Taylor, 136 a 2002 decision. The juvenile
court judge who was responsible for appointing a lawyer to represent Mickens on the
murder charge he faced had to have been struck by the coincidence of the victim’s
identity. She had appointed a lawyer for the victim on weapons and assault charges just
17 days earlier and had dismissed those charges when the victim’s body was
discovered.137 The very next day, however, she called the lawyer she had appointed for
the victim and asked him to “do her a favor” and represent the person who was charged
with killing his former client.138 The lawyer did not object to being placed in a situation
that might compromise his ability to represent Mickens and Mickens himself did not
discover the conflict until after he was convicted and sentenced to death.139
In these circumstances, the majority held, Mickens’ right to effective assistance of
counsel depended on his establishing that some action the lawyer took after being
appointed was adversely affected by his prior representation of the murder victim. The
message to judges charged with appointing lawyers in criminal cases is a conditional one:
even if you are aware that a lawyer serves conflicting interests, your failure to act will
only violate the Sixth Amendment if the lawyer’s subsequent behavior shows some effect
traceable to the conflict.140
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Mickens offered several reasons why the rule should be a
conditional one. One was the underlying purpose he attributed to the right to counsel, as
in Strickland. The Constitution protects defendants from being represented by lawyers
who have divided interests “not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the
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ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.”141 And the way that the Court can tell if a
defendant had a “fair trial” is to determine if “defects in assistance that have [a] probable
effect upon the trial's outcome.”142
In conflict of interest cases, though, the Court makes an exception to the rule that
requires a defendant to show an effect on the outcome. Unless the judge improperly
overrules an objection that has been raised prior to trial, as in Glasser, the defendant must
show that the lawyer’s divided loyalties had an effect on some action the lawyer took or
neglected to take, but not a probable effect on the outcome.143 Since the lawyer’s dual
representation may make it impossible for the defendant to show prejudice in terms of
outcome, all that the Court looks for in this situation is a determination that the lawyer’s
performance was adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest. This future
consequence still leaves the rule in conditional form. And in Justice Scalia’s view,
finding a violation of the rule from the facts in Mickens would be cutting the right to
counsel too far adrift from its purpose of ensuring reliable results.
Justice Scalia also believed that it was unnecessary to abandon a conditional rule in
Mickens as a way of ensuring that judges conscientiously carry out their obligation to
ensure that a defendant receives conflict free counsel. Judges, he assumed, are not “as
careless or as partial as those police officers who need the incentive of the exclusionary
rule.”144
Justice Souter’s dissent addressed both these points. He saw a non-conditional rule
requiring a judge to act whenever she learns that defense counsel labors under a conflict
the only “sensible regime.”145 “The best time to deal with a known threat to the basic
guarantee of fair trial,” he wrote, “is before the trial has proceeded to become unfair.”146
The majority’s position, he maintained, was “skewed against recognizing judicial
responsibility.”147
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Justice Souter also took aim at the majority’s defense of a conditional rule on the
ground of the underlying value of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:
Requiring a criminal defendant to prove a conflict's adverse effect in all noobjection cases only makes sense on the Court's presumption that the Sixth
Amendment right against ineffective assistance of counsel is at its core nothing
more than a utilitarian right against unprofessional errors that have detectable
effects on outcome. . . . the right against ineffective assistance of counsel has as
much to do with public confidence in the professionalism of lawyers as with the
results of legal proceedings. A revelation that a trusted advocate could not place
his client's interest above the interests of self and others in the satisfaction of his
professional responsibilities will destroy that confidence, regardless of
outcome.148
B. Liability Rules
Conditional rules do not have to rely on a post hoc evaluation of whether there is
prejudice. Another way to make a rule conditional is to cast it as a liability rule. This
type of rule allows the actor to engage in the conduct that it addresses but gives to the
person whose legal entitlement the act adversely affects the right to obtain a remedy. The
essence of a liability rule is that it depends for its enforcement on the reaction of the
person most closely affected seeing that the remedial mechanism that accompanies it is
put into play.
It is, to pick a sports analogy closer to the American heart than soccer, like the rule in
baseball that requires a base runner to wait until a fly ball is caught before leaving the
base to advance her position. If a runner leaves early, the individuals charged with
enforcing the rule will not act on their own. It is up to the opposing team to lodge an
appeal which sets in motion the umpire’s ruling that the runner left early and is, therefore,
out.149
Liability rules play a major role in the law of torts, where they represent the most
efficient way to distribute resources when negotiation between the parties is not
practical.150 As a mechanism for constitutional rules, the most familiar example for this
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type of format is the Takings Clause.151 The Takings Clause does not regulate when or
how or under what conditions the government may take private property for public use.
The rule only prescribes what the government must do after it has taken the property.152
In three different situations (dressing the defendant in prison clothes at trial, asking a
defendant on cross examination about exercising Miranda rights, and the police
confronting a person with a show of force demanding that he or she submits), the
Supreme Court has crafted constitutional rules that operate much like liability rules.
They depend on the reaction of the person who is the rule’s intended beneficiary to
determine if the governmental actor whom the rule regulates has violated its precept. In
each case, if the target does not respond in the way necessary to define a violation of the
rule, the actor’s behavior becomes unobjectionable. If, on the other hand, the target does
react in the appropriate way, what the actor has done will have violated the target’s
rights. In a fourth context, a prosecutor’s introduction into evidence of a confession by a
codefendant implicating the defendant, the Court has molded a constitutional rule into an
even more unwieldy format that resembles a liability rule but differs in one respect. The
rule depends on the future action of someone other than the beneficiary of the rule to
determine the legitimacy of what the government actor has done.
i. Due Process and the Defendant’s Right Not to Appear at Trial in Prison
Clothes
A number of free standing dictates of the Due Process Clause flow from the concept of
the presumption of innocence. This bedrock principle has implications for a variety of
facets of the criminal trial system. It bears on the extent to which a defendant may be
deprived of his liberty prior to conviction,153 the instructions the jury receives about the
significance of the fact that the defendant has been charged with a crime,154 and the
requirement that prosecution bear the burden of proof on each of its elements.155 It also
comes into play when the jury is exposed to information that presents an unacceptable
risk of influencing them to convict the defendant not because of the strength of the
evidence but because of his status as someone accused of a crime.
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In Estelle v. Williams, 156 the Court considered the implication of this dynamic in a
case in which the defendant was clothed in prison attire throughout the course of his trial.
The court system in which Williams was tried, Houston, Texas, routinely had defendants
who were held on bail appear before the juries who sat on their cases in distinctive,
prison issue clothing. The Court was aware of the psychological implications of a
defendant’s appearance: “The defendant's clothing is so likely to be a continuing
influence throughout the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the custody of deputy
sheriffs who were also witnesses for the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of
impermissible factors coming into play.”157 But, the rule the Court constructed to meet
this danger was a conditional one. It is only forcing a defendant to wear prison clothes in
the face of an objection that violates the Constitution.158
Now, there is a constitutional rule whose language and purpose make the prior
existence of an objection by the person whom the rule is intended to protect a perfectly
sensible requirement. The privilege against self incrimination protects a person from
“be[ing] compelled to be a witness against himself.” Compulsion is part of the linguistic
formula and one of the prerequisites for the historical condemnation of the government’s
effort to obtain information that it needs to prosecute someone. When a witness is on the
stand and is asked a question whose answer might be incriminating, the law governing
the privilege requires the witness to seek its protection and refuse to answer before being
able to find shelter in its protection. If the witness answers without having first asserted
the privilege, the answer is not compelled and therefore does not give rise to any occasion
for remedying a violation of the rule. As a result, the ordinary rule that governs the
application of the privilege does not prohibit a government official like a prosecutor or
judge from asking a witness a question that might tend to incriminate. What the rule
prohibits, however, is compelling someone to answer over his or her objection. Once the
privilege is claimed, in other words, its protection comes into play.
Obviously, there is no similar linguistic basis for a rule that has as its foundation the
Due Process Clause. Estelle found another basis for justifying the incorporation of a
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requirement that the defendant object. “It is not an uncommon defense tactic.” Chief
Justice Burger wrote, “to produce the defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting
sympathy from the jury. . . . Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the
assistance of counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be
made before and during trial rests with the accused and his attorney. Any other approach
would rewrite the duties of trial judges and counsel in our legal system.”159
There is a familiar doctrine that holds defendants to strategic choices by which they, or
their attorneys, consciously choose not to assert underlying rights. That is, of course, the
concept of waiver. If a defendant knowingly and voluntarily chooses to forego a
protection that the Constitution would otherwise provide, the criminal justice system is
under no obligation to remedy the rule violation that preceded the waiver. But clearly,
this is not the basis on which the Court decided Williams. Under a waiver approach, the
Court would have recognized that the judge’s decision to have the defendant appear in
prison clothes was a violation of due process and placed on the state the burden of
showing that the defendant waived this right. There was nothing in the record to indicate
in the slightest that the defendant wanted to wear prison clothes in front of the jury.
Nor is it accurate to view Williams as an example of the closely related doctrine of
procedural default that the Court could have used to justify its conclusion. Unlike
waiver, this concept does not presuppose the defendant’s active abandonment of the
rule’s protection. Rather, it strips the defendant of the ability to complain about the rule’s
violation because of a failure to assert the right at issue pursuant to the terms of a fair
procedural mechanism.160 While Williams appears superficially to be a procedural
default case, since it emphasized the defendant’s lack of an objection when he clearly
knew that he was wearing prison clothes, it differs in a fundamental way. Procedural
default is a doctrine about the remedies that one loses by failing to follow the proper
procedure. Williams is about the content of the rule that the judge must follow.
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The four justices who joined the majority opinion in Williams could not have been
unaware of the possibility of reaching the result they did by relying on the doctrine of
procedural default. Justices Powell and Stewart concurred on precisely this ground. In
their view, no relief was warranted in this case because the defense attorney was aware of
the possibility of objecting to the way his client was dressed and failed to do so simply
because he mistakenly thought it futile.161
There are different conclusions one might draw from the majority’s crafting a
conditional rule rather than relying on the doctrine of procedural default. One is the
possibility that the majority was concerned that the procedural default doctrine would not
be strong enough medicine to ensure the finality of convictions in cases where the
defendant did not lodge an objection. At the time Williams was decided, 1976, the law of
constitutional remedies was much more forgiving than it became in the last two decades
of the twentieth century. Defendants in the mid-1970’s whose lawyers had failed to
object to the violation of their clients’ rights stood a much better chance of getting relief
in a habeas corpus action than their successors thirty years later when habeas relief was
much stingier.
There is another conclusion that one may draw from the majority opinion in Williams.
By making the rule conditional, the Court may simply have been signaling trial judges
that they have completely unfettered discretion in making decisions about whether
defendants appear in prison clothes. Certainly, if the rule in Williams were not cast in
conditional form, the state would appear to have an affirmative obligation to provide a
less emotionally charged wardrobe for the defendants it chooses to prosecute. It may be
that Williams was motivated by a desire to spare that expense.
ii. Due Process and Evidence that the Defendant Remained Silent After Receiving
a Miranda Warning
The famous Miranda decision has become so embedded in popular culture that almost
every English speaking moviegoer or television watcher knows that after you are
arrested, you have a right to remain silent. In Doyle v. Ohio, 162 the Court held that if a
suspect hears this warning and relies on it, it is so fundamentally unfair to allow the
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prosecutor to use the defendant’s silence as evidence of his guilt that it violates due
process. For eleven years, the Doyle rule appeared to be straight forward. Prosecutors
knew that they could not attempt to bring to the attention of the jury the fact that the
defendant had remained silent after receiving a Miranda warning. Greer v. Miller, 163
however, made the rule a conditional one.
Charles Miller took the stand in his murder trial and testified that he had nothing to
do with the crime. When the prosecutor had an opportunity to cross examine, he chose to
start out strong.
Q: Mr. Miller, how old are you?
A: 23.
Q: Why didn't you tell this story to anybody when you got arrested?164
By highlighting the defendant’s post-Miranda silence at the very beginning of his cross
examination, the prosecutor cannot have been unaware of the impact this point must have
had on the jury. It was no accident that it was the second question, immediately after
asking the defendant’s age. Defense counsel certainly knew what the prosecutor was up
to, for an objection immediately followed. The judge instructed the jury to “ignore [the]
question, for the time being.”165 The prosecutor never returned to the issue. Miller was
convicted.
Both state appellate courts that considered Miller’s appeal, the federal district court
that granted him habeas corpus relief, and the Seventh Circuit panel as well as the en
banc court which affirmed, all approached the case on the understanding that the
prosecutor’s question violated the defendant’s right to remain silent. For each of these
courts, the only issue they thought relevant was to decide whether the violation was
harmless or not.
The question on which the Court granted certiorari was what the standard of
harmless error should be in a habeas proceeding for a Doyle violation.166 But
somewhere in the course of its consideration of the case, the Court changed the structure
of the Doyle rule.
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Doyle itself dealt with a case in which the prosecutor had been permitted to question
the defendant about his failure to tell the police the same story as included in his direct
testimony and to argue to the jury that his post-Miranda silence was proof that his claim
of innocence at trial was contrived. Since the context of the case presented the Court
with a fait accompli concerning the unfair use of the defendant’s silence, there was no
reason for Doyle to have paid attention to the difference between the effect of a
prosecutor merely asking the forbidden question and the defendant’s answering it. So,
the way that the Doyle opinion phased its rule allowed the majority in Geer to find room
to make it conditional.
The quotes from Doyle that Greer excerpted to illustrate its rule gave it room to
maneuver:
the holding of Doyle is that the Due Process Clause bars “the use for
impeachment purposes” of a defendant's postarrest silence. (emphasis added). The
Court noted that “‘it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution
during trial to call attention to [the defendant's] silence.’”167
The choice to make Doyle a conditional rule may have been a result of the majority’s
reluctance to face head on the proper application of the harmless error doctrine to Doyle
violations. More than one Circuit had taken the position that “Doyle violations are rarely
harmless,”168 and there was an as yet unsettled question of whether the standard for
harmless error should be the same in a habeas corpus case, as this one was, as on direct
review. Because the defendant in Greer never answered the prosecutor’s question, the
Court held, there was no Doyle violation in the first place and thus no need to address the
question of what harmless error standard should apply.169
Four Justices disagreed with the majority’s decision to make Doyle a conditional rule.
Justice Stevens “agree[d] with the 10 Illinois judges and 12 federal judges who have
concluded that the rule of the Doyle case was violated when the prosecutor called the
jury's attention to respondent's silence.”170 Although he affirmed the conviction on the
ground that the error was harmless, he felt that the majority’s approach robbed the Doyle
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rule of clarity.171 Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun criticized the majority for
eschewing a harmless error approach that would have been more nuanced than the blunt
conditional rule that the Court adopted. A harmless error analysis could not only take
into account the fact that the prosecutor’s question went unanswered (the major factor
relevant to the majority’s conditional rule),172 but also the other events at trial that might
have led the jury to weigh the defendant’s silence after arrest despite the lack of explicit
testimony on the point.173
iii. The Fourth Amendment and the Definition of a Seizure
If there is any provision in the Constitution where both the historical understanding
and the contemporary application depend on government officials being subject to clear
rules which tell them in advance of their exercise of power whether they can act or not,
the Fourth Amendment would be at the top of almost every list. Much of the Court’s
recent Fourth Amendment analysis is driven by its desire to make things simple for the
police officers who have to translate their legal doctrine into action out on the street.174
Yet in one important area, the Court has constructed a Fourth Amendment conditional
171
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rule that makes the legitimacy of what a police officer does dependent on how the target
of his actions responds.
Boiled down to its essence, all Fourth Amendment issues relevant to the cop on the
beat depend on a preliminary question that defineS the relevant scope of action that the
Amendment controls. Is she is doing something that the Amendment addresses? The
Fourth Amendment regulates only searches and seizures. If a police officer contemplates
doing something that fits neither category, like shining a flashlight into a car parked on a
public street or following someone walking through a public park, then that is the end of
the matter. It is only if the conduct fits into one of these two categories that the officer
has to apply the myriad rules the Court has crafted to fit the Amendment’s standard of
reasonableness to the vast array of modern day contexts in which we expect our police to
act.
The most common area where police action implicates the Fourth Amendment is in
one of the two varieties of seizures that infringe on an individual’s liberty interest. Ever
since the Court broke the mold of a unitary Fourth Amendment in Terry v. Ohio, 175
police and courts classify seizures depending on how intrusive they are, into either Terry
stops or full scale arrests. In order to make the sort of brief stop of a suspect that Terry
allows in order to conduct a threshold inquiry, an officer needs some reasonable
suspicion that the person is, has been or will be engaged in a crime.
Reasonable suspicion, the Court has held many times, is determined ex ante.176 It
depends not on what the true state of affairs turns out to be after the fact, but on how
things appear to the officer at the time she exercises her power. Otherwise, the Fourth
Amendment cannot serve as a guide to the officer’s behavior.
One would think that the same logic must apply to the question of defining a seizure.
If an officer cannot tell in advance if she proposes to engage in activity regulated by the
Fourth Amendment, how can she know if what she plans to do crosses the line? This was
essentially the question that the Court confronted in California v. Hodari D.177
The officers whose actions precipitated the Court’s encounter came across Hodari
Dulin in an alley where he and a number of other young men were huddled around a car.

175
176

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See, e.g., id. at 22.

Conditional Rules

46

The boys scattered when they saw the officers and, predictably, the police gave chase. In
the course of the pursuit, one of the officers saw Dulin throw down a small rock of what
he later learned was crack cocaine. In the juvenile court proceeding he faced, Dulin
sought to suppress the use of the drugs as evidence, on the ground that he had been seized
without justification at the initiation of the chase and the discovery of the cocaine was a
“fruit of the poisonous tree.” Since the state conceded that up until the time Dulin
dropped the drugs the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Dulin was engaged
in any criminal activity, the legality of the officer’s discovery of the drugs depended on
whether Dulin had been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when he saw the officer
begin the chase.
In doctrinal terms, the resolution of Hodari D. depended on whether the Court would
continue to adhere to its most widely accepted modern day formulation of what
constituted a seizure or would revert to the historical common law understanding. The
prevailing contemporary test for defining a seizure under circumstances like Dulin’s was
an objective one: “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”178 No one on the
Court disputed that the officer’s action, chasing Dulin, implicitly communicated that the
state intended to interfere with his freedom to run down that alley.
The common law definition of a seizure came exclusively from the tort law of
trespass. It required that either the police must touch their suspect physically or the
suspect must submit in some way to a show of force. Since Dulin was not touched and
certainly did not submit, he would have been unable successfully to establish the
elements of trespass, as the doctrine was known in the 18th century.
Underlying the choice between these two approaches were the different views the
Justices had on the practical consequence of the rule that would emerge. The historical
account leads to a conditional rule that gives police officers much more freedom in using
a display of authority to get people’s cooperation, even if those people are viewed by the
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police as targets for whom they lack objective indicia of criminality. Justice Scalia, who
wrote the majority opinion in Hodari D. clearly belongs in this camp:
We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter, to stretch the Fourth
Amendment beyond its words and beyond the meaning of arrest . . . Street
pursuits always place the public at some risk, and compliance with police orders
to stop should therefore be encouraged. Only a few of those orders, we must
presume, will be without adequate basis, and since the addressee has no ready
means of identifying the deficient ones it almost invariably is the responsible
course to comply. Unlawful orders will not be deterred, moreover, by sanctioning
through the exclusionary rule those of them that are not obeyed. Since policemen
do not command “Stop!” expecting to be ignored, or give chase hoping to be
outrun, it fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine, successful
seizures.179
The two dissenters, Justices Stevens and Marshall, thought that the construction of a
conditional rule to govern when police officers could attempt to interfere with a person’s
liberty “profoundly unwise.”180 Without a rule that allowed a police officer to know in
advance whether his course of action was consistent with the restrictions of the Fourth
Amendment, they argued, not only creates uncertainty but also provides police with a
perverse incentive. Since merely directing a menacing show of force at an individual is,
under the majority’s view, not governed by the Fourth Amendment, police officers would
be free to threaten to interfere with someone whom they could not lawfully stop and hope
that the suspect’s reaction gave them the reasonable suspicion that they otherwise lacked.
“In an airport setting,” Justice Stevens posed, “may a drug enforcement agent now
approach a group of passengers with his gun drawn, announce a ‘baggage search,’ and
rely on the passengers' reactions to justify his investigative stops?”181 Hodari D. gives
the police reason to think that nothing in the Fourth Amendment prevents them from
drawing their gun and shooting it at someone, without any reason at all, so long as the
person at the other end of the barrel has the intestinal fortitude to ignore the threat and the
luck to dodge the bullet.
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iv. The Confrontation Clause and the Admissibility of an Codefendant’s
Confession
In Bruton v. United States,182 the Court held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits a
prosecutor from introducing as evidence at a joint trial the confession of one of the group
charged with the crime if it incriminates a codefendant, even if the jury receives an
instruction directing them to consider it only against the person who made it. The
problem such a situation creates for the values the Confrontation Clause protects stems
from the Court’s assumption about the utility of a limiting instruction in this
circumstance. The chance that the jury would use the confession against both the person
who made it and the person whom it mentions is overwhelming.183 Once that barrier is
breached, the confession becomes part of the evidence against the nonconfessing
codefendant, and its admission without the ability to cross examine its maker violates the
Confrontation Clause’s core guarantee.184
On its face, then, Bruton presents a straight forward nonconditional rule. But two
years later, in Nelson v. O’Neil,185 the Court found a way to make it less clear. The trial
in Nelson involved two codefendants, O’Neil and Runnels. Runnels confessed and
implicated O’Neil. The prosecutor put three witnesses on the stand: a police officer who
testified to the circumstances of the arrest; the victim of the crime, who identified both
men; and the police office to whom Runnels made his confession. The judge instructed
the jury that they were to use the confession as evidence only against Runnels, not
O’Neil. The trial took place before Bruton was decided, so neither the prosecutor nor the
judge would have had a reason to believe that this limiting instruction did not eliminate
the Confrontation Clause problem inherent in the prosecutor’s use of the confession.
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Bruton, however, had been given retroactive effect in Roberts v. Russell,186 so O’Neil
was able to raise his Confrontation Clause claim in a habeas corpus petition.
Nelson, however, presented the Court with a development at trial that Bruton did not.
As part of the defense case, each defendant took the stand. O’Neil testified to an alibi.
Runnels not only corroborated the alibi, contradicting the account in the police officer’s
testimony about the confession, but he denied making the confession at all. O’Neil’s
defense counsel had an opportunity to cross examine Runnels, but chose to forego the
chance. Since the principal vice the Court saw in the Bruton situation was the admission
of an inculpatory statement by an out of court declarant who was “unavailable at the trial
for ‘full and effective’ cross-examination,”187 the mere prospect of putting questions to
Runnels that O’Neil had when his codefendant took the stand was enough to take this
case out of the ambit of Bruton.188
What makes Nelson significant for the purpose of bringing it into the lineup of
conditional rule cases is the way the Court described the consequence of Runnels’
availability for cross examination. The Court announced as the reason for ruling against
O’Neil: “there was no violation of the Constitution in this case.”189 The simplest
meaning of this way of describing O’Neil’s claim is to see Bruton as a conditional rule.
With the benefit of hindsight, knowing that O’Neil had a chance to cross examine the
person who made the confession, the Court treated this situation like a prosecutor’s
asking a question about a defendant’s assertion of Miranda rights, or a judge ordering a
defendant to appear before the jury in prison clothes, or a police officer drawing a gun
and ordering someone to halt. In all of these situations, something that happened in the
future determined if the Constitution had been violated or not.
If the Court had meant to convey that Bruton was not a conditional rule, it could easily
have adopted either of the two lines of reasoning that the government put forward on the
merits in the Ninth Circuit to argue against O’Neil’s Confrontation Clause claim. The
186
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first of these arguments was that the opportunity to cross examine Runnels “cured” the
Bruton error.190 Going to a doctor who cures a disease is quite different than going to one
who tells you you’re perfectly healthy. If the Court had used “cure” language, the rule
would not have been conditional. But it did not.
The Supreme Court was certainly familiar with the concept of curing an error. The
Court had used the metaphor in considering whether a prosecutor’s correction of his own
improper remarks cured the error of their presentation before the jury,191 a judge’s
instruction cured the error of a prosecutor mentioning testimony in the government’s
opening statement that was not forthcoming in the case in chief,192 and whether a defense
attorney’s use of a peremptory challenge cured a judge’s error in allowed a juror to sit
who was not qualified.193 But there isn’t any hint in Nelson that this is what the Court
was doing. The majority’s opinion eschewed any suggestion that what Runnels did cured
a preexisting violation of the Confrontation Clause. It simply made the post hoc
announcement that there was no violation at all.
The other argument the Court could have adopted in Nelson was that the Bruton error
was harmless.194 But as with the possibility of framing what had happened as a cure, the
Court rejected this way of describing O’Neil’s claim.195 Rather than conceding there was
an error, the Court concluded that an assessment of what the Confrontation Clause
requires extends beyond the close of the prosecutor’s case, making it a conditional rule:
We conclude that where a codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies
making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds
to testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the
defendant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.196
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Courts and commentators have, by and large, overlooked the conditional nature of the
rule in Nelson. This absence is hardly surprising in reported decisions, given that the vast
majority of them come from judges reviewing convictions after the fact, when a court
already knows if the person who made the confession testified or not. From that vantage
point, nothing turns on whether one describes the rule was conditional, though some
courts still persist in labeling what happened a “cure” of a prior Confrontation Clause
violation,197 rather than saying as did the Supreme Court that the defendant’s rights were
not violated at all. On occasion, though, one can find a trial court opinion that takes
advantage of the conditional nature of Nelson. Where a defendant moves on Bruton
grounds to sever a pending trial from that of a codefendant who has confessed,198 and
where the trial judge is reasonably certain that the codefendant will take the stand, Nelson
has been used as authority for denying severance on the ground that in the end, there will
be no Confrontation Clause violation.199 If Nelson were not in a conditional format, one
can hardly imagine a trial judge allowing the prosecutor to use the codefendant’s
confession as part of the state’s case in chief. It would be akin to denying a meritorious
motion to suppress a confession on the ground that the defendant indicated he would
plead guilty if he lost, raising the prospect that the issue of the confession would be
moot.200
The scarcity of cases where a trial judge allows a prosecutor to use a codefendant’s
unredacted confession is a reflection of the unusual nature of Nelson’s conditional rule.
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Unlike the others that resemble liability rules, the future action that determines the
constitutionality of admitting an unredacted codefendant’s confession is dependent on the
decision of a third party, not the person whose rights are at issue. Moreover, the third
party’s behavior comes, if at all, at some point in time far removed from the action of the
government that placed the defendant’s rights in jeopardy. Even more significantly, the
remedy for a violation of the rule is relatively severe. In the prison clothes context, if the
defendant objects to the way he or she is dressed, it simply means that someone has to
bring in something else to wear. If a prosecutor asks a question implicating Doyle, an
objection to the question simply leads to the judge instructing the witness not to answer
and telling the jury to draw no inference from the question. And when a suspect submits
to an official show of force for which there is no justification, the police are put in no
worse a situation in terms of discovering evidence of a crime than they would have been
in had they done nothing.201 In a situation raising a Bruton issue, however, if the
codefendant who made the confession does not eventually take the stand, then the judge
must almost always declare a mistrial.
The awkward nature of prospectively applying a conditional rule where the
consequence of being wrong is so great has the practical effect of influencing those who
must abide by the rule to treat it as if it were unconditional.202 Indeed, the Supreme Court
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(i) a joint trial at which the statement is not admitted into evidence;
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is not unmindful of the awkwardness of a conditional rule in protecting a defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights. In a case applying Bruton to the problem of redacted
confessions, Richardson v. Marsh,203 the Court explicitly rejected a conditional rule
because it was unworkable.
Richardson addressed the question of whether Bruton would bar a codefendant’s
confession that had been redacted to eliminate any reference to the defendant, in
circumstances where other evidence made clear that the confession inculpated the
defendant. The case involved a joint trial of two codefendants, Marsh and Williams. As
part of the state’s case charging them in a robbery murder scheme, the prosecution
introduced Williams’ confession into evidence. The confession described how Williams
and someone named Martin drove to the robbery scene, discussing what would happen
along the way. According to the confession, Martin said that he would have to kill the
victims after the robbery.204 The confession neither mentioned Marsh nor averted to the
participation of a third person in the crime.205 The judge instructed the jury to consider
the confession as evidence only against Williams, not Marsh.206 Williams did not
testify.207
What created the problem for Marsh was the other evidence in the case. The only
surviving victim testified that Marsh arrived at the scene together with Williams and
Martin and helped them commit the robbery, leading to an inference that she must have
been in the car and overheard her two cohorts plan the crime while they were all driving
to the scene.208 Marsh’s own testimony provided another link. While she testified that
her presence at the scene was as an unwitting dupe, she also admitted that she had

(ii) a joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only after all
references to the moving defendant have been deleted, provided that, as deleted,
the confession will not prejudice the moving defendant; or
(iii) severance of the moving defendant.
Rule 14 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide a mechanism for a judge to alleviate
Bruton problems in advance, by providing that “In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the
court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any
statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at
the trial.” FED. R. CRIM. PRO. R. 14 (b).
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traveled to the scene of the robbery in the car with Martin and Williams, albeit for an
innocent purpose.209 She told the jury she knew they were discussing something, but that
she sat in the back seat and could not hear the conversation.210 But of course, the jury
was not bound to accept all of what she said. They could, and evidently did, believe she
was in the car and disbelieved her denying knowing about the plan.
The question that split the majority and the dissent in Richardson was whether to
apply Bruton by considering only the confession on its face, or to evaluate it in the
context of all of the evidence to determine if it incriminated the defendant. One of the
factors that played into this decision was the practical effect of each position. How
would the trial judge apply a rule making the admissibility of the codefendant’s
confession turn on how the rest of the evidence came out?
Justice Stevens, in dissent, proposed a conditional rule. “In most [of these kinds of]
cases the trial judge can comply with the dictates of Bruton by postponing his or her
decision on the admissibility of the confession until the prosecution rests, at which time
its potentially inculpatory effect can be evaluated in the light of the government’s entire
case.”211
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, pounced on the problems that this proposal, as
all conditional rules, would entail:
Even more significantly, evidence requiring linkage differs from evidence
incriminating on its face in the practical effects which application of the Bruton
exception would produce. If limited to facially incriminating confessions, Bruton
can be complied with by redaction -- a possibility suggested in that opinion itself.
If extended to confessions incriminating by connection, not only is that not
possible, but it is not even possible to predict the admissibility of a confession in
advance of trial. The “contextual implication” doctrine . . . would presumably
require the trial judge to assess at the end of each trial whether, in light of all of
the evidence, a nontestifying codefendant's confession has been so “powerfully
incriminating” that a new, separate trial is required for the defendant. This
obviously lends itself to manipulation by the defense -- and even without
manipulation will result in numerous mistrials and appeals. It might be suggested
that those consequences could be reduced by conducting a pretrial hearing at
209
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which prosecution and defense would reveal the evidence they plan to introduce,
enabling the court to assess compliance with Bruton ex ante rather than ex post. If
this approach is even feasible under the Federal Rules (which is doubtful -- see,
e. g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 14), it would be time consuming and obviously far
from foolproof.212
Neither opinion in Richardson mentions Nelson, much less avers to the fact that the
Bruton doctrine was already a conditional rule.
C. Aggregation
The third way that the Supreme Court has made constitutional rules conditional is to
aggregate the time frame in which to make a judgment about the legitimacy of an actor’s
behavior. As with the other forms of conditional rules, in order to determine if the action
at issue is constitutional, one must take into account a future event. But with aggregation,
the future event is one taken by the same actor who was responsible for the original
action, or by someone exercising government power toward the same end.213 In generic
form, such a rule has the following form:
(i) If a government official does X at time 1, then it violates the Constitution for
the government to do Y at time 2.
(ii) X and Y both must occur to violate the rule.
For the appropriate sports analogy, one must turn to football. In order to make a
judgment about whether an ineligible receiver has gone downfield on a pass play, the
referee cannot simply determine how far an interior lineman has moved past the line of
scrimmage as the quarterback goes back to pass. One must wait until the quarterback
actually throws the ball while an ineligible receiver is in a prohibited position before one
can determine that a foul has occurred.214
At a trivial level, something like this analysis operates whenever a judge makes an
order for something to happen which will violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant. If the order is never executed, the mere announcement will not violate the
Constitution, absent some extraordinary circumstance by which the words alone have an
212
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effect on the process. It is on this basis, for example, that the result the Court reached in
Gaines v. Washington makes sense.215 The defendant in Gaines claimed that he was
denied his right to a public trial by virtue of the trial judge’s order closing the courtroom.
The record, however, disclosed that that either the judge changed his mind or the bailiffs
simply ignored him. Because nothing ever happened as a result of the judge’s original
order, the Court refused to find any rule violation.
It is easy to see why aggregation is necessary in a Gaines situation. Since the judge’s
order was never implemented, his words were no more damaging to the defendant than
the private thought that immediately preceded them. Even where this is not the case,
however, aggregation is some times necessary because the words that the defendant
objects to are but a small part of a continuous course of action whose impact depends on
the overall effect. This is what occurs when one must decide if a judge or prosecutor has
deprived the defendant of a constitutional right by a single comment that comes in the
course of a relatively lengthy presentation. An isolated slip of the tongue that is
immediately corrected, for example, would not violate any constitutional rule.216
When judges instruct juries on the law they must apply in deciding a defendant’s guilt,
they often allude to a particular legal doctrine a number of times, using different vantage
points to illuminate related aspects of interlocking concepts. For example, a judge may
tell the jury about the doctrine of the presumption of innocence, the prosecution’s burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and how to evaluate the truthfulness of witnesses’
testimony. An isolated statement to the effect that “every witness is presumed to speak
the truth,” appears problematic in a case where all of the witnesses appeared for the
prosecution, as occurred in Cupp v. Naughten.217 In considering, however, whether this
statement so undermined the presumption of innocence that it deprived the defendant of
due process, the Court applied an aggregation technique that made evaluating the
constitutional rule conditional:
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In determining the effect of this instruction . . . we accept at the outset the wellestablished proposition that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in
artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. While
this does not mean that an instruction by itself may never rise to the level of
constitutional error, it does recognize that a judgment of conviction is commonly
the culmination of a trial which includes testimony of witnesses, argument of
counsel, receipt of exhibits in evidence, and instruction of the jury by the judge.
Thus not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but
the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial which
may result in the judgment of conviction.218
The same holds true when considering whether a single part of a prosecutor’s closing
statement to a jury violates due process.219
In the situations discussed below, however, the appeal of aggregation is less obvious.
The time frame within which events are aggregated is much lengthier and the effect of
freeing the earlier action from the direct application of the Constitution is more drastic.
i. The Sixth Amendment Right to the Appointment of Counsel For Indigent
Defendants Accused of Misdemeanors
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided one of the iconic cases in constitutional criminal
procedure, Gideon v. Wainwright.220 Gideon held that the state of Florida violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to appoint a lawyer for an
indigent defendant charged with a felony. The case arose in the heyday of due process
incorporation, when the Warren Court picked its way one by one through the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights and decided whether or not they applied to the states in
more or less the same format as they did to the federal government. As did almost every
other incorporation case, Gideon held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
provision was the constitutional rule that governed the appointment of counsel in state
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courts, rather than a more general and less generous due process balancing test. Justice
Black wrote for the Court: “[Reason] and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”221 Finding the
right to counsel “fundamental and essential to a fair trial,” 222 the Court held that this part
of the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the states.
On its face, however, the right to counsel clause does not explicitly address the
question that Gideon raised. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”223 There is no reference to
the right to have the state appoint you a lawyer if you are too poor to hire one on your
own. And, the historical context against which the provision was included in the Bill of
Rights presented a quite different issue, the practice of English courts denying all felony
defendants the right to be represented by any attorney whatsoever. Nevertheless, Gideon
did not have to craft its own answer to what the right to counsel provision of the Sixth
Amendment meant for criminal courts confronted by an indigent defendant.
In 1938, the Court had decided one of the few right to counsel cases that came to its
docket from the federal process, Johnson v. Zerbst.224 Johnson was a habeas corpus
petition challenging a federal conviction on the ground that having been denied an
appointed lawyer and being unable to afford one on his own, the defendant was being
held in custody in violation of his right under the Sixth Amendment. The Court viewed
the right to counsel as a cornerstone of the integrity of the entire criminal process, one of
the “essential barriers against arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights.”225 Relying
on Powell v. Alabama for the proposition that without a lawyer, the right to a hearing is
essentially meaningless for even an intelligent and sophisticated lay defendant, the Court
held that “The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he
has or waives the assistance of counsel.”226 Counsel was so fundamentally important a
221
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feature that without it, the Court, “kiss[ed] the jurisdictional book”227 and made the claim
cognizable in habeas corpus.
By incorporating the right to counsel clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, Gideon
established a relatively straightforward non-conditional rule. But the state criminal court
systems dwarfed their federal counterparts and the practical problem of providing
attorneys for the millions of state defendants led to efforts to restrict the scope of
Gideon’s mandate. The obvious path to take for states that could not, or did not want to,
appoint attorneys in every case was to confine Gideon only to felony cases. One could
defend this line on more than pragmatic grounds. Gideon itself was a felony case, and
the Court’s language about the need for a lawyer to make the process fair arguably was
less relevant to the often simple and relatively brief proceedings that resolved most
misdemeanors. Moreover, there was a constitutional provision, the right to a jury, that
incorporated a distinction that very closely tracked the felony-misdemeanor line.
Defendants in petty cases, generally those subject to a maximum sentence of less than six
months, were not entitled to a jury.228 If defendants in less serious cases could be tried
without a jury, why not without a lawyer?
This led to the two cases in which the Court defined the limit of the Gideon principle,
Argersinger v. Hamlin,229 which came first, and Scott v. Illinois.230 Argersinger and
Scott both involved misdemeanor convictions of indigent defendants who had been
denied an appointed lawyer. They differed, however, in one fundamental respect.
Argersinger was sentenced to a short jail term and Scott received only a fine. The rule
that emerged from the two was classically conditional. An indigent misdemeanor
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel is violated if, and only if, at the
end of the process he receives a sentence of imprisonment. Thus, in Argersinger, where
the defendant went to jail, the Court held that his conviction, not his sentence, violated
the Constitution.231 And in Scott, where jail was not an issue, the conviction was
unexceptional.
227
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One might think that these two cases are not really right to counsel cases at all, but
simply regulate a judge’s sentencing authority. One could reformulate the rule that
emerged from Scott as a non-conditional one, telling judges they may not sentence an
indigent defendant to incarceration in a misdemeanor case if the defendant was not
afforded the right to appointed counsel. But that kind of a rule would logically require a
quite different remedy than the one that the Court imposed in Argersinger. A sentencing
rule would call for a new sentencing procedure, not invalidating the underlying
conviction. Thus, the misdemeanor version of the right to counsel rule is truly a
conditional one, you cannot tell if the judge violated the rule until after the sentence is
imposed.
The problem this creates, of course, is that a judge has to make a decision about
whether to appoint counsel at the start of the process. In order to implement the rule in
its conditional format, a judge would have to make a decision at arraignment whether to
preserve the option of incarceration for a misdemeanor defendant. The information
available at such an early stage of the process is almost always far less meaningful to an
intelligent sentencing decision than after a full exposition of the facts. The end result
may be that a judge will be forced by circumstance to “abandon his responsibility to
consider the full range of punishments established by the legislature.”232
It is clear from both opinions that resource concerns played a major rule in the Court’s
decision not to extend Gideon to the misdemeanor context. Argersinger noted that
misdemeanor cases outnumbered felonies by more than ten to one, and that did not even
count the 40 to 50 million traffic cases each year.233 But there were a number of ways to
create a different rule for misdemeanors without making it conditional. Various
alternatives were proposed by one Justice or another writing in the two cases when not in
the majority. Among them were proposals to draw the line at cases where there was no
statutorily authorized term of imprisonment possible, or where the defendant was charged
with a petty crime so that there would be no constitutional right to a jury.
Scott’s conclusion to keep the conditional rule by construing Argersinger’s line as the
limit of the right to counsel was, at bottom, a pragmatic one. Perhaps the most telling
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part of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion was the one that asserted: “Argersinger has
proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create confusion and impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States.”234 Keeping a
conditional rule was, quite simply, the cheapest alternative.
ii. The Privilege Against Self Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”235 From the
time of its adoption, until the Supreme Court decided Chavez v. Martinez in 2003, 236 the
rule was almost universally considered to be non-conditional. It prohibited using
compulsion to obtain testimony that could be used to provide a link a chain of evidence
that might incriminate the person from whom the government sought the information.
Chavez reconfigured it. Now, when a government official like a police officer
questioning a suspect in custody, a judge presiding over a grand jury, or counsel for a
legislative committee questioning a witness, threatens or applies compulsion to get an
incriminating answer, they have not violated the privilege against self incrimination at all.
They have merely set in motion a potential violation, which becomes complete only if,
and when, the compelled testimony is introduced as evidence against its author.237
Chavez was a civil rights action under § 1983 seeking damages for a violation of the
plaintiff’s right to substantive due process and to the privilege against self incrimination.
Martinez, the plaintiff, was riding his bicycle by the scene of a narcotics investigation
when he was stopped and frisked by police officers. An altercation broke out and
Martinez was shot several times, his wounds severe enough to leave him permanently
blind and paralyzed from the waist down. A patrol supervisor, Chavez, accompanied him
to the hospital and it is the interrogation that took place while Martinez was in the
emergency room that gave rise to the civil rights suit.
The due process claim, based on the allegation that Chavez intentionally inflicted
mental anguish on the plaintiff by refusing to cease his questioning while Martinez was in
233

See id. at 34 citing President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 55 (1967).
234
See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
235
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
236
See 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
237
See id. at 767.

Conditional Rules

62

severe pain and believed he was dying, was remanded to the lower courts. The self
incrimination claim, however, did not fare as well, because of the way a majority of the
Court recast the rule.
Martinez was never charged with a crime and so the statements he made while Chavez
interrogated him in the emergency room were never used as evidence against him at a
criminal trial. That led the Court to consider whether the rule implementing the privilege
is a conditional one. “Statements compelled by police interrogations of course may not be
used against a defendant at trial,” Justice Thomas wrote in his plurality opinion, “but it is
not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause
occurs.”238 Since Martinez was never tried, he suffered no infringement to his right under
the privilege.
That makes the rule truly a conditional one. If a police officer coerces a statement
from a suspect, and like in Chavez, future events do not unfold so that the statement is
used as evidence against him, then the officer has not violated the privilege. On the other
hand, if the statement is used at trial, then the logical implication of Chavez is not only
that the defendant has been deprived of his right under the privilege, but that the officer
who coerced the statement has violated the rule.
Had Chavez meant to convey the message that the privilege simply does not restrict
the actions of the person who compels the statement, but only the people who offer and
allow it into evidence, there would have been no need for the opinions constituting the
majority to focus on the fact that Martinez had not yet been tried. They simply would
have pointed out that he picked the wrong defendant. But what the Court focused on was
not the irrelevance of the privilege for those who compel suspects to talk, but the fact that
the violation is not complete until the statements are used at trial.
Justice Thomas’ plurality opinion relied primarily on a textual analysis of the Privilege
to justify the conclusion that a courtroom use of the suspect’s statement was a necessary
ingredient. Since the language in the Fifth Amendment restricted the application of the
privilege to criminal cases (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case”), for
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Justice Thomas the way to begin was to see if what happened to Martinez occurred in the
context of a criminal case. For this, he turned to the dictionary. According to the
definition he found there, criminal cases require some formal initiation of legal
proceedings, not just police questioning.239 Textualism, then, compelled the Court to
construe the privilege as a conditional rule.
It would have been passing strange, however, to lawyers practicing at the time that the
privilege was made a part of the Constitution to think that it was needed in order to
protect defendants from being compelled to testify against themselves in their own
criminal cases. That really was not a problem that could have been on anyone’s mind, for
the simple reason that defendants, as interested parties, were uniformly disqualified from
testifying at all.240 The only places where compelled testimony could have been
worrisome were precisely in those forums that were outside the common understanding
of a criminal case. For example, as a witness before a grand jury or in a civil case.
Indeed, precisely the argument Justice Thomas made was rejected by the Court in
1892, in Counselman v. Hitchcock.241 The government argued there that a grand jury
witness could not rely on the privilege because “[i]t is only ‘in a criminal case’ that a
witness can refuse to answer. An investigation before a grand jury is in no sense ‘a
criminal case.’”242 Counselman’s response to this claim reaffirmed the non-conditional
nature of the rule:
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can only be, that a
person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal
prosecution against himself. It would doubtless cover such cases; but it is not
limited to them. The object was to insure that a person should not be compelled,
when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend
to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to
criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard.243
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Now, none of the members of the majority opinion on the privilege issue in Chavez
advocated requiring grand jury witnesses to give incriminating answers. Justice Thomas
recognized the continued vitality of the principle that a witness could assert the Privilege
outside the context of a criminal case.244 But the cases that recognized this principle, he
asserted, were not direct applications of the Constitution but prophylactic rules designed
to “safeguard the core constitutional right.”245
Two observations come to mind about this argument. First, it sounds very odd coming
from someone who was one of the two dissenters in Dickerson v. United States.246
Dickerson was decided only three years before Chavez, and it put the Court to the hard
choice of either admitting that Miranda was a prophylactic rule that Congress could
override or explaining why it had a sound constitutional basis. The majority, in the view
of the dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia and Thomas, never squarely answered this
question. But the two dissenters, both of whom joined not only there but also in the
pertinent part of the Chavez case, were not so reticent in their views on the legitimacy of
the Court’s constructing prophylactic rules. To give but a mild example:
[T]hat this Court has the power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to
expand it, imposing what it regards as useful “prophylactic” restrictions upon
Congress and the States . . . . is an immense and frightening antidemocratic
power, and it does not exist.247
Second, prophylactic rules, legitimate or not, are entirely a creature of the mid-1960’s.
It entails some degree of historical revisionism to attribute to the Courts writing opinions
condemning the compulsion of witnesses before grand juries, legislative hearings and
administrative proceedings, which date back at least to Chief Justice Marshall’s 1807
circuit opinion in United States v. Burr, 248 the construction of a prophylactic rule rather
than the announcement of what they believed the Constitution itself required.
If it was not fidelity to history that drove the majority to the conclusion that the
privilege against self incrimination must be a conditional rule, then what explains the
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result? Well, making the privilege conditional was one way to relieve the defendants in
Chavez of civil liability for failing to give the gravely injured suspect a Miranda warning.
One can see how the prospect of a lawsuit every time a suspect claimed he or she was
questioned in violation of Miranda would have been daunting. Chavez has the potential
of reducing almost to a nullity the class of potential plaintiffs who could successfully sue
a police officer for using coercion to elicit an incriminating statement. Since the future
consequence which defines the violation is use at trial, how will Chavez apply to
someone who successfully suppressed their statement prior to trial? If all that happened
is that the prosecutor unsuccessfully tried to use the defendant’s coerced statement, it is
hard to see the Chavez majority finding a violation of the rule. That means the only
people who will have a viable case will be those who made a statement in the face of
police coercion, lost a suppression motion, had the statement admitted at trial, and either
were acquitted or got their conviction reversed on the ground that the statement should
not have been allowed into evidence. There aren’t many lawyers who would want to
confine their practices to this universe of potential clients.
iii. Government Interference With the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel
One of the corollaries of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the rule that prevents
the government from interfering with an established attorney-client relationship. In the
Morrison case discussed in the section on prejudice and the right to effective assistance
of counsel, for example, the Court assumed that it violated the Sixth Amendment for law
enforcement officials to try to convince the defendant to abandon her attorney and
cooperate with them by disparaging her lawyer.249
Another aspect of the lawyer-client relationship that has a constitutional dimension is
the sanctity of privileged communications between the two. If the government listens in
on a conversation about the case between a defendant and her lawyer, does it violate the
Constitution? Again, the answer is, it depends. This time, on what the unwanted listener
does with the information.
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The Court confronted this issue in Weatherford v. Bursey.250 Weatherford was a
§1983 civil rights action against an undercover agent for the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division, Weatherford. Weatherford had sat in on discussions between
Bursey and his attorney. The Bursey defense team was planning for an upcoming trial
charging Bursey with malicious destruction of property for throwing a brick through the
window of a Selective Service office. Bursey and his lawyer believed Weatherford, who
had also been indicted for the same offense after participating in the brick throwing
incident, was a legitimate codefendant. They invited him to participate in their
discussions because they believed that he could provide information and ideas that would
benefit Bursey’s defense.251
Because Weatherford wanted to maintain his undercover status so that he could
continue to develop information on criminal behavior by other members of the anti-war
movement at the local university, he attended the meetings without, of course, revealing
his affiliation with the prosecution. At these meetings, Bursey and his lawyer discussed
with Weatherford the possibility of there being an informer in the midst of the group, but
they never suspected how close he really was. Since no one ever asked him, Weatherford
never had to deny his true affiliation.252
Weatherford’s plans to remain undercover were frustrated when his affiliation with the
prosecutor’s office became known inadvertently and the prosecutor thereupon decided to
use him as an eyewitness. He testified at Bursey’s trial and was instrumental in obtaining
the conviction which led to Bursey serving an eighteen month sentence. When Bursey
got out, he sued the agent for depriving him of the effective assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment guaranteed.
The trial court found that Weatherford never revealed any of the details of the
conversation between Bursey and his lawyer, either in his testimony at trial or in his
communications with the prosecutor. That made aggregation the key to Bursey’s claim.
If one aggregated the undercover agent and the prosecutor for whom he worked and who
directed his actions, it would be an easy case. Even the United States, in its amicus brief
supporting Weatherford, conceded that it would violate the Sixth Amendment if the
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government “receives . . . privileged information pertaining to the defense of the
criminal charges . . . because the Sixth Amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee can
be meaningfully implemented only if a criminal defendant knows that his
communications with his attorney are private and that his lawful preparations for trial are
secure against intrusion by the government, his adversary in the criminal proceeding.”253
On the other hand, if the Court aggregated the actions of the undercover agent over
time, rather than across bureaucratic labels, Bursey’s claim looked a lot different. And
that is what the Court did. The opinion did not simply focus on Weatherford’s actions
actively hiding his allegiance to the prosecution and invading the attorney client
relationship. It looked at his behavior after the fact to determine if he violated the rule. It
construed the Sixth Amendment rule to prohibit not invading of the attorney client
relationship, but communicating what was learned, either at trial or to the prosecutor.
The Court explained the rationale for its conditional rule:
As long as the information possessed by Weatherford remained uncommunicated,
he posed no substantial threat to Bursey’s Sixth Amendment rights. Nor do we
believe that federal or state prosecutors will be so prone to lie or the difficulties of
proof will be so great that we must always assume not only that an informant
communicates what he learns from an encounter with the defendant and his
counsel but also that what he communicates has the potential for detriment to the
defendant or benefit to the prosecutor's case.254
Clearly, the Court saw nothing wrong with Weatherford’s presence at the meeting. Later
in the opinion, it did point out that Weatherford had not actively sought to join Bursey
and his lawyer, but had been invited and attended only in order to maintain his cover.255
However, nothing in the rationale the opinion offered, which looked exclusively at
Weatherford’s behavior after the fact, would make this factor determinative.
If one takes a different view of the effect of undercover agents insinuating themselves
into the bosom of the defense team, the logic of a conditional rule is less attractive.
Justice Marshall’s dissent considered the effect of condoning the placement of
prosecution witnesses into otherwise private meetings between a defendant and defense
counsel:
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even if the witnesses cannot divulge the information to the prosecution . . . [they]
are in a position to formulate in advance answers to anticipated questions, and
even to shade their testimony to meet expected defenses. Furthermore, because of
these dangers defendants may be deterred from exercising their right to
communicate candidly with their lawyers if government witnesses can intrude
upon the lawyer-client relationship with impunity so long as they do not discuss
what they learn with the prosecutor. And insofar as the Sixth Amendment
establishes an independent right to confidential communications with a lawyer,
that right by definition is invaded when a government agent attends meetings of
the defense team at which defense plans are reviewed.256
The dissent was also less willing to assume that defendants would be in a position after
the fact to learn that an informer had communicated to the prosecutor the details of a
privileged discussion. Surely, it reasoned, it would be unlikely for the informer to offer
up such information. And, it would require a prosecutor of uncommon virtue to report
such an event, given the likely consequences not only in terms of civil liability as in
Weatherford but also with respect to the real possibility that it would prevent the case
against the defendant from going forward.
iv. Identification Procedures, the Right to Counsel and Due Process
If you see enough crime stories on television or film, you’ll come across a scene where
the police take a suspect into custody and in order to sew up the case, have the victim
view him a lineup or take a peek at him sitting in handcuffs in the back of a police car.
When the scene shifts to the trial, it typically includes the little bit of manufactured drama
when the victim takes the stand, looks around the courtroom and then points to the guy
sitting next to the defense attorney as the person who committed the crime.
When these events occur in real life, it implicates two constitutional doctrines. One is
relevant if the identification procedure occurred after the defendant has been formally
charged with a crime. If so, then the right to counsel has attached and the defendant is
entitled under the Sixth Amendment to have a lawyer present.257 The other stems from
the possibility that the way the police have arranged the encounter made it unnecessarily
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suggestive. When that happens there is a substantial risk that the witness mistakenly
identified the wrong person. This raises a concern under the Due Process Clause.258
The first of these constitutional rules, the one dealing with the right to counsel, places
a direct obligation on the police to respect the suspect’s right to counsel. The other one,
dealing with suggestive identification procedures, is conditional. The rule does not
directly govern the behavior of the police at all. The Supreme Court has disaggregated
the actors in the process so that the police do not violate the Constitution by conducting
an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. Rather, it is the prosecutor at trial
who does so if he or she elicits testimony about what happened.
The Supreme Court announced both the right to counsel and due process doctrines
governing identification procedures on the same day in 1967, in a trilogy of cases: Wade
v. United States,259 Gilbert v. California,260 and Stovall v. Denno.261 The first two dealt
with the consequence of the police conducting a lineup or a showup without affording
him the right to have an attorney present.262 Wade made clear that the Sixth Amendment
was violated at the lineup itself:
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional
or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of
reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself can often
avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there
can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a
critical stage of the prosecution at which he was “as much entitled to
such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial itself.”263
If any doubt remained about whose conduct the Sixth Amendment addressed in the
identification context, Gilbert laid it to rest:
police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the absence of his
counsel denies the accused his Sixth [and Fourteenth] Amendment right to
counsel and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-court
identifications of the accused by witnesses who attended the lineup.264
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While Wade and Gilbert established a rule that applied to the police, there were
implications for what happened in the courtroom as well. If the prosecutor attempted to
introduce evidence of a tainted identification at trial, it called for the remedy of exclusion
as a way of ensuring police compliance with the Sixth Amendment.
Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an
effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will
respect the accused’s constitutional right to the presence of his
counsel at the critical lineup.265
Stovall required the Court to consider the due process implications of an identification
procedure because the Sixth Amendment rule the Court adopted in Wade and Gilbert was
not an available tool. Stovall came to the Court as a habeas corpus case, unlike Wade and
Gilbert, and as a result could benefit from the Sixth Amendment rule the latter two
announced only if it would be given retroactive effect. The Court concluded that it would
not,266 but went on to consider if the confrontation between Stovall and the witness was
“so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification”267 that
it denied the defendant due process of law. “This is a recognized ground of attack upon a
conviction,” the Court announced, “independent of any right to counsel claim.”268 In a
very brief discussion, the Court concluded that the identification was not unnecessarily
suggestive, despite the fact that the encounter was a one person showup. This was so, the
Court explained, because the circumstances the police confronted left them no reasonable
alternative. The identifying witness was the victim of a brutal knife attack and was on
the edge of death in a hospital room. A more impartial procedure, like a lineup, simply
was not possible.269
In the years immediately following Stovall, there was reason to believe its due process
rule applied to the police, just as did Wade’s right to counsel rule. In a case that came to
the Court five years later, Kirby v. Illinois,270 holding that suspects subject to
identification procedures prior to the formal initiation of charges had no right to counsel,
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the plurality opinion for the Court described Stovall that way: “The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.”271 It is the police, after all, who
conduct lineups. So it was reasonable to take away from Kirby the idea that it was the
police to whom the due process rule of Stovall was directed.
The resolution of this issue had some practical consequences. If Stovall applied
directly to the police, then it bolstered an interpretation that created a per se rule
prohibiting unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures without regard for factors
that might indicate the identification was nevertheless reliable, such as the amount of
time the witness had to observe the person committing the crime. On the other hand, if
Stovall merely regulated the type of evidence the prosecutor could introduce, then it
would be much easier to incorporate into the rule these sorts of reliability factors.
This issue came to a head in Manson v. Brathwaite.272 Arrayed before the Court were
the two choices. As the majority saw them, the advantage of the per se approach was
“the elimination of evidence of uncertain reliability, deterrence of the police and
prosecutors, and the stated ‘fair assurance against the awful risks of
misidentification.’”273 The other alternative, to permit evidence of a suggestive
identification if it possessed “certain features of reliability,”274 had the attraction of
serving “to limit the societal costs imposed by a sanction that excludes relevant evidence
from consideration and evaluation by the trier of fact.”275 While the majority recognized
that the per se approach would be a better vehicle for shaping police behavior in the
direction of avoiding unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures,276 its view of the
audience to whom the Due Process Clause was directed dictated its choice.

271

Id. at 691.
432 U.S. 98 (1977). The Court also considered this issue earlier, in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972) and indicated that the majority would not accept a rule that did not take into account factors that
might make an unnecessarily suggestive identification reliable. See id. at 198-99. But Biggers involved a
pre-Stovall identification and the opinion hinted that a different result might be appropriate for post-Stovall
situations. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 197 (“One perhaps might argue that, by implication, the Court
suggested that a different rule could apply post-Stovall.”)
id. at 199.
273
432 U.S. at 110.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 112.
272

Conditional Rules

72

Unlike a warrantless search, a suggestive preindictment identification procedure
does not in itself intrude upon a constitutionally protected interest. Thus,
considerations urging the exclusion of evidence deriving from a constitutional
violation do not bear on the instant problem. See United States ex rel. Kirby v.
Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406 (7th 1975).277
The cite to the Seventh Circuit case was from an opinion that Justice Stevens wrote
before he joined the Court. In it, he explained:
a showup does not itself violate any constitutional right of the suspect. Unlike a
warrantless search, which may violate a constitutionally protected interest in
privacy, the identification of a suspect -- whether fair or unfair -- does not
necessarily affect any constitutionally protected interest of the suspect. The due
process clause applies only to proceedings which result in a deprivation of life,
liberty or property. The due process issue, therefore, does not arise until testimony
about the showup -- or perhaps obtained as a result of the showup -- is offered at
the criminal trial. If that evidence is unfairly prejudicial, the trial judge may have
a constitutional obligation to exclude it, or possibly to mitigate its impact by an
appropriate cautionary instruction to the jury. But if a constitutional violation
results from a showup, it occurs in the courtroom, not in the police station.278
Justices Marshall and Brennan were the only dissenters. They clearly did not want a
conditional rule. As they saw it:
Stovall . . . established a due process right of criminal suspects to be
free from confrontations that, under all the circumstances, are
unnecessarily suggestive. The right was enforceable by exclusion at
trial of evidence of the constitutionally invalid identification.279
Brathwaite thus made Stovall a conditional rule. The police themselves could not
violate it. They merely set the table for what a prosecutor might do. Aside from affecting
the contour of the rule itself, as in Brathwaite, there was another practical consequence.
This characterization of the rule means that a suspect who has been wrongfully convicted
on the basis of an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure the police arranged
cannot sue the police for a civil rights violation, since there is no underlying
constitutional rule regulating the police.280

277

Id. at 113 n. 13.
United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406 (7th 1975).
279
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 119. See also id. at 122 (“Where the prosecution sought to use evidence of a
questionable pretrial identification, Stovall required its exclusion, because due process had been violated by
the confrontation, unless the necessity for the unduly suggestive procedure outweighed its potential for
generating an irreparably mistaken identification.”)
280
See e.g., Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2007).
278

Conditional Rules

73

v. The Due Process Right of a Defendant to Present Exculpatory Evidence at
Trial
The Sixth Amendment is the part of the Bill of Rights that appears to be the most
relevant to the question of what limitations a judge may place on a defendant’s efforts to
place evidence before the jury. On its face, the Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
looks like the provision that should govern any dispute over the the scope of the cross
examination of prosecution witnesses.281 And if an issue arose about the relevance of
questions a defense attorney could ask on direct examination, one would think the judge
should turn to the Amendment’s provision dealing with the right to compulsory process
for an answer.282 In Chambers v. Mississippi,283 however, the Court confronted a case
presenting a combination of these two problems and concluded that taken together, they
amounted to a violation of the Due Process Clause. In reaching this result, the Court
relied on a conditional rule that depended on the coexistence of two events, one of which
followed the other.
Chambers was convicted of murdering a police officer. Key to his defense strategy
was presenting the jury with evidence that someone else, McDonald, did it.284 McDonald
had admitted the crime to Chambers’ attorney but later disavowed the confession, saying
he was cajoled into it by a promise that he would be able to share in the proceeds of a
civil suit that Chambers would bring against the town.285 However, he also repeated the
confession to several other witnesses.286 At trial, the prosecution did not present
McDonald as a witness, since he did not purport to have anything relevant to say about
why the jury should convict Chambers. It was the defense that called McDonald to the
stand, and through him introduced his confession to the attorney into evidence. However,
on cross examination, McDonald repudiated the confession. When Chambers’ attorney
asked the trial judge to permit him to examine McDonald on redirect as a hostile witness,
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the judge refused, relying on on a Mississippi evidentiary doctrine, the “voucher” rule,
which prevented the proponent of a witness from impeaching him or her.287 This ruling
effectively prevented Chambers from confronting McDonald with the incriminating
statements he made to other witnesses or challenging his renunciation of the
confession.288 Chambers was also thwarted in his effort to present the testimony of three
of the witnesses to whom McDonald had admitted shooting the officer. The judge
sustained an objection to this testimony on hearsay grounds, since Mississippi recognized
only statements against pecuniary, not penal, interest as an exception.289
The Supreme Court found that what had happened in Chambers’ trial violated the
Constitution. But it was not the parts of the Bill of Rights that most narrowly addressed
the two problems about which Chambers complained, his inability to cross examine
McDonald or to present the testimony of his three witnesses. The Court did not rely on
either the Confrontation Clause or the Compulsory Process Clause as the basis for its
decision. The reason was that Chambers had never preserved a federal claim in the state
court system on either of these two grounds. The only federal claim that he did properly
present to the Supreme Court was a post trial assertion that his conviction denied him the
fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.290 It was, in other
words, a general due process claim. Given the context in which the federal question
came to the Court, the Justices had to consider “the cumulative effect of [the] rulings in
frustrating [Chambers’] efforts to develop an exculpatory defense.”291 This had the effect
of making the claim a conditional one, because it could only have been raised after the
conclusion of all of the evidence was presented.292
The Court did separately discuss what was wrong with the two types of rulings the
trial judge made. It called the voucher rule archaic and irrational,293 and rejected the

287

Id. at 295.
Id. at 291.
289
Id. at 292.
290
Id. at 290 n. 3. The Court’s later views of the Due Process Clause make it very unlikely that it would
use it as a vehicle for addressing concerns such as these. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352
(1990) (“Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has
limited operation.”)
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
Id. at 296 n. 8.
288

Conditional Rules

75

state’s argument that McDonald’s testimony was not adverse to Chambers.294 However,
the opinion never took the final step of declaring that the trial judge violated the
Constitution at the time he made the ruling limiting the questioning of McDonald. “We
need not decide,” Justice Powell wrote for the Court, “whether this error alone would
occasion reversal since Chambers’ claimed denial of due process rests on the ultimate
impact of that error when viewed in conjunction with the trial court’s refusal to permit
him to call other witnesses.”295
It was harder for the Court to condemn as severely the trial judge’s ruling preventing
Chambers from calling the witnesses who would have testified that they overheard
McDonald confess to the crime. That ruling was based on the hearsay doctrine, in
particular the feature of Mississippi evidence law that refused to recognize an exception
for statements against penal interest.296 At the time that Chambers came to the Court,
federal law, on the authority of Donnelly v. United States,297 also refused to recognize
this hearsay exception. Never the less, the Chambers Court concluded that the
circumstances of the hearsay statements before it “provided considerable assurance of
their reliability,”298 and that “the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to
defeat the ends of justice.”299 But yet again, it refused to announce a nonconditional rule.
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled with the State’s
refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial in
accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process. In reaching
this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our
holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in
the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances
of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. (italics
added)300
As the holding in Chambers depended on the conjunction of two events, it is hard to
see how the rule could be anything but conditional. The opinion went out of its way to
say that neither of the two state court rulings that it considered independently violated
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due process. Since trials are sequential affairs, whichever ruling comes first one has to
wait for the other shoe to drop in order to say that Chambers condemns what has
happened.
III. Evaluating Conditional Rules
A. The Negative Side of Conditional Rules
i. The Effect in Shaping Behavior
Conditional rules are difficult to apply before all of their constituent events have taken
place. Chambers v. Mississippi301 illustrates this conundrum. The case gives little
guidance to trial judges and lawyers who have to know in advance what evidence the
Constitution renders admissible despite the existence of state evidence prohibitions.
Lower courts have differed over whether Chambers contains two nonconditional rules
that trial judges can apply in advance of an attempt to introduce evidence (in ruling on the
admission of statements against penal interest302 or an attempt by a proponent of a
witness to impeach his or her credibility303) or a contextually based ruling that combines
the effect the excluded evidence on the ability of the defendant fairly to present his
case.304
The confusion is understandable. One ordinarily thinks of Supreme Court decisions as
useful vehicles for providing guidance on how to avoid a similar problem in the future.
There is, concomitantly, an inevitable pressure to try to find in any decision a rule that
one can actually apply. However, if one recognizes that Chambers used a conditional
rule, it has little value as a guide to behavior useful to a trial judge. It is perhaps this
difficulty that led Professor Peter Westen, a prominent evidence scholar and the lawyer
who represented Chambers in the Supreme Court,305 to write shortly after the case came
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out that “it is difficult to derive a clear standard from Chambers,”306 and Justice Scalia to
express doubt that one could meaningfully extract any holding from the case.307
What made Chambers v. Mississippi such a difficult case revealed one of the reasons
why an appellate court may prefer to announce a conditional rule. If a court wanted to
reverse a conviction without having to create a precedent for how state actors should
exercise power in the future, incorporating a prejudice requirement into the rule is a good
way to do it. This, in fact, is how Professor Westen,308 and Justice Scalia309 have
portrayed Chambers.
Rules, however, serve as more than vehicles for justifying why courts can reverse
criminal convictions. They also act as a mechanism to guide the behavior of those who
are its target. Indeed, the primary purpose of a rule has to be to affect behavior,
otherwise it is not a rule.310 Whether a rule limits the way a police officer exercises her
authority to seize an individual on the street, requires a judge to allow a defendant to
litigate in the absence of the jury the issue of whether the defendant’s confession was not
voluntary, or directs an appellate court automatically to reverse a conviction if the
defendant was denied the right to have a lawyer represent him at trial, it must provide
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some meaningful guidance on how to exercise power under a grant of government
authority.
However, conditional rules, to put it simply, are lousy at guiding behavior. Indeed,
when legislative bodies, administrative agencies or advisory groups promulgate rules to
guide the behavior of government actors, they do not put them in a conditional format.
The rules of professional responsibility that govern prosecutors do not incorporate a
prejudice requirement in describing the obligation to reveal exculpatory evidence.311
Court rules dealing with severance do not instruct judges facing a potential Bruton
problem to withhold judgment because in the latter stages of the trial the codefendant
who confessed may take the stand and eliminate the Confrontation Clause problem.312
And police manuals do not instruct officers to draw their guns on suspects without any
reason to believe they have committed a crime, hoping that the suspect will run away
rather than submit.313
Conditional rules do not make sense in these contexts because they do not tell the
people who look to the rules for guidance how to act at the time they must make
decisions about their behavior. Nor do they make sense as part of the Constitution.
Those sections of the Bill of Rights that regulate the criminal justice system were the
result of a fear of the potential misuse of government power.314 The Bill of Rights, and in
particular the Due Process Clause, was a direct descendant of that mother of all
constitutional limits on the exercise of force that is the criminal law, Magna Carta,315 a
document with which all educated people in 18th century America would have been
acquainted.316 Magna Carta was both a political manifesto and a statement of rules that
the King had to obey to ensure that he would not engage in abusive behavior in the
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future.317 This notion that an important function of a fundamental declaration of rights
was to guide the future behavior of those with the power to threaten those rights would
naturally have been part of the world view of the Framers. Clear, easy to apply rules
were, in their view, best suited to this end.318 Conditional rules are not an appropriate
way to address this concern.
Rules, of course, are not always easy to apply for the actors who must look to them for
guidance. Questions of interpretation are an inherent problem. Making a rule conditional,
however, detracts significantly from a rule’s ability to affect the behavior of those to
whom it is directed. And that is true whether you think that the people the rules are
designed to limit view them as aspirations or hindrances.
Imagine how a conditional rule looks from the vantage point of a government official
who does not internalize what she understands to be the constitutional limits on her
power. When faced with a choice about how to act in a situation governed by a rule, she
simply makes a utilitarian calculation about whether the benefit she will receive, either
institutionally or personally, if she violates the rule outweighs the potential disadvantage
of whatever sanction a rule violation entails. The negative consequence that this
Holmesian “bad official” 319 must take into consideration depends, of course, not only on
how much she wants to avoid it but also on the probability that it will ever come to
pass.320 By adding into the definition of the rule some future consequence that may never
occur, by necessity it lowers the probability that a sanction will be imposed.
Take, for example, the conditional rule dealing with the prosecutor’s obligation to
reveal exculpatory evidence. How does the conditional Brady rule affect this type of
prosecutor? Perhaps she has in her hands a piece of exculpatory information, say the fact
that a key witness was the beneficiary of a promise to drop pending charges against him
in return for his testimony, that she does not want to turn over to the defense. The
317
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existence of a prejudice requirement as part of the rule means that the incentive to
disclose the information is diminished, in some proportion, by the degree to which she
foresees the defendant being unable to establish prejudice. The correlation may be not
proportional, but it is certainly positively correlated.
There are a lot of ways that this prosecutor could realistically believe that the
defendant would ultimately fail to establish prejudice. The most likely is if the defendant
pleads guilty, as do 90% or so of all those charged with a crime. If the case is pled out, a
common view of Brady insulates the prosecutor from any sanction for withholding the
information:
Because a Brady violation is defined in terms of the potential effects of
undisclosed information on a judge's or jury's assessment of guilt, it follows that
the failure of a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory information to an individual
waiving his right to trial is not a constitutional violation.321
Even if the case goes to trial, the conditional nature of the rule makes it difficult for
the defendant to establish prejudice. In the relatively rare likelihood that the defendant is
acquitted, there is literally no Brady violation about which to complain. Since Brady’s
prejudice requirement looks to the probability of more favorable outcome had the
prosecutor not hidden the exculpatory evidence, a defendant who benefits from the most
favorable outcome possible cannot point to a better result. The venal prosecutor’s effort
may have been in vain, but at least the loss at trial insulates her from any charge that she
violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.322
In the more common event that the trial ends in conviction, the psychological
phenomenon known as hindsight bias makes it difficult to prove prejudice. Hindsight
bias is the tendency to view something that has already happened as having been
inevitable.323 Since resolving a claim of a Brady violation can realistically only take
place after the trial has occurred, convictions are the inevitable context in which these
decisions are made. When judges are called upon to decide whether a Brady violation has
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occurred after a conviction, they already know the result of the trial. It is difficult to get a
judge to agree that there was a reasonable probability that a guilty verdict would not have
occurred if only the prosecutor had revealed the exculpatory information in a timely
way.324
Even from the perspective of a prosecutor who wants to abide by the restriction of the
Brady rule, its conditional nature creates an environment that fosters instances where
exculpatory information is withheld.325 While Brady is defined ex post, prosecutors have
to make decisions about how to avoid Brady violations ex ante. By giving them the
responsibility for identifying the occasions on which they must limit their own power, the
Brady rule puts them in a position of doing a job which sets them at cross purposes with
themselves.
Few, if any, law abiding prosecutors would try to convict someone whom they
believed innocent. That being the case, every time a prosecutor has to make a decision
about whether to turn over Brady material, what is at stake is doing what the Constitution
may require at the cost of increasing the chance that a defendant who deserves to be
punished will be acquitted. Despite the universal platitude after every not guilty verdict
that the prosecutors’ office seeks only justice and justice is served by acquittals as well as
convictions, losing is never in the real interest of a line prosecutor. Since the Brady
doctrine requires prosecutors to evaluate not only the way that a jury might be affected by
a piece of information but the overall impact of that information in the context of the
entire case the prosecutor expects to present, it is easy to see how the significance of
something that is clearly exculpatory on its face may fail to receive an objective
evaluation. No social psychologist would be surprised to learn that prosecutors are no
better than anyone else in avoiding the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, the
psychological mechanism that downplays the significance of information that conflicts
with a preexisting opinion.326
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Justice Marshall illustrated this point in his dissenting opinion in Bagley, as support
for his criticism of the majority’s making the Brady rule conditional.327 Justice Marshall
recounted an incident five years after the Brady opinion became law, when a large group
of New York state prosecutors was asked if they would reveal to defense counsel the fact
that one eyewitness to a bank robbery had definitively said the defendant was not the
culprit if there were five other witnesses who made a positive identification. Now, at the
time this group was asked their opinion, it was not at all clear that the Brady rule was
conditional. Agurs had not yet been decided and it was Agurs that recast the rule to
require prejudice. However, even in that environment, only two prosecutors indicated
that they would turn the information over to the defense.328
Even without the effect of cognitive dissonance, putting a rule in conditional form
makes it harder for the actors who are subject to its mandate to determine exactly what
they may and may not do. Whether they have to make a judgment about the potential
prejudicial effect of their decisions, or anticipate the reaction of the person whose rights
are implicated by them, or predict how they or others with whom they act in concert will
behave in the future in light of the decision they make in the present, there is another
layer of complexity involved. Actors with a stake in the outcome are particularly poor
candidates to make this assessment.329
Even trial judges, who presumably do not have an interest in the outcome, are more
likely to engage in behavior that is subject to a conditional rule than one put in a nonconditional format. Justice White apparently thought so. In his concurring opinion in
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 330 he agreed with the government’s contention that the
Confrontation Clause rule that prohibits judges from prohibiting cross examination
designed to show the bias of a prosecution witness should be a conditional one that
incorporates an “outcome determinative” prejudice requirement.331 His rationale for
wanting the rule to be conditional was the effect he thought it would have on the behavior
of trial judges. Making the rule non-conditional, he believed, would “undermine [their]
327
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authority . . . to restrict cross-examination .”332 The non-conditional rule that Van Arsdall
propounded, in Justice White’s view, would, in close cases, influence trial judges to
“permit the examination rather than risk being guilty of misunderstanding the
constitutional requirements of a fair trial.”333
ii. Vehicles for Ex Ante Prevention
Conditional rules are not only ineffective as instruments to control behavior. They
also present a barrier to a court using the rule as a basis for action designed avoid
violations in the future.
The conditional rules where this phenomenon arises are the ones that incorporate a
requirement of prejudice. The Strickland rule is a good example. A defendant cannot
establish a violation of the rule requiring effective assistance of counsel unless he raises a
reasonable probable that the shortcoming about which he complains adversely affected
the result. Given the contextual judgment that the rule requires, the only practical way to
apply it is after the fact. But that does not mean it is impossible to spot in advance
institutional structures and individual practices that are highly likely to result in violations
of the rule when it comes time to make the post hoc evaluation. The conditional nature of
the Strickland rule, however, makes it difficult to ask a court to entertain an ex ante
claim.
Say you are a defendant in the middle of your trial and you believe that your defense
attorney’s performance has failed to meet the constitutionally mandated standard. In all
but the most rare examples where it is clear that the lawyer’s shortcoming will inevitably
and fatally taint the verdict, your complaint will have to wait until you are convicted. As
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals put it in holding that Strickland claims must
await the conclusion of the trial:
The problem with applying the Strickland test in the middle of an ongoing trial is
that the “result” or “outcome” of the proceeding has yet to be determined. Thus
the trial court would be required to assess prospectively the likely prejudicial
effect of counsel’s alleged errors before it has had an opportunity to hear all the
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evidence in the case, and before the jury, if there is one, has even begun to
deliberate. 334
Defendants seeking to use Brady as the source for having a court order the prosecution
to deliver material that is facially exculpatory prior to trial will encounter a similar
problem. In the Second Circuit, for example, a District Judge may not order the
government to produce Brady material upon request by the defendant, because the
conditional nature of the rule does not create the opportunity for the judge to enforce a
constitutional mandate before the requirement of prejudice is met:
Although the government's obligations under Brady may be thought of as a
constitutional duty arising before or during the trial of a defendant, the scope of
the government's constitutional duty--and, concomitantly, the scope of a
defendant's constitutional right--is ultimately defined retrospectively, by reference
to the likely effect that the suppression of particular evidence had on the outcome
of the trial. . . . “It is not feasible or desirable to specify the extent or timing of
[the] disclosure Brady and its progeny require, except in terms of the sufficiency,
under the circumstances, of the defense’s opportunity to use the evidence when
disclosure is made.”335
The conditional nature of a rule not only makes it difficult for a court to address the
problem in a particular case ex ante, it also stands as a barrier to claims for institutional
reform. For example, the way that some jurisdictions have structured the provision of
defense services for indigent defendants in criminal cases raises serious doubts about its
ability to meet the constitutional standard of reasonably effective counsel. Jurisdictions
that starve their defender programs of resources and overload their attorneys are likely to
spawn cases that would meet the Strickland prejudice test after the fact. But, prior to a
conviction, criminal defendants facing pending charges lack standing to use Strickland as
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the basis for asking a court to order the changes necessary to avoid the risk. As one court
explained:
Here, [a criminal defendant facing a pending charge] seeks to enjoin the Marion
County public defender system because it effectively denies indigents the
effective assistance of counsel. However, a violation of a Sixth Amendment right
will arise only after a defendant has shown he was prejudiced by an unfair trial.
This prejudice is essential to a viable Sixth Amendment claim and will exhibit
itself only upon a showing that the outcome of the proceeding was unreliable.
Accordingly, the claims presented here are not reviewable under the Sixth
Amendment as we have no proceeding and outcome from which to base our
analysis.336
iii. Misleading Messages
Conditional rules send a misleading message to the public about what sort of
protection they can expect when dealing with officials in the criminal justice system. All
but the most sophisticated observers of the Supreme Court are likely to come away with
the impression that it is the predicate behavior itself that the Constitution prohibits and
not the predicate plus whatever future event serves to complete the violation. That was
part of the difficulty with Chambers, where the audience construing the message
consisted of appellate judges. The problem is much more severe when it is the general
public.
Consider, for a minute, the one rule in constitutional criminal procedure that likely has
the most wide spread currency in popular culture, the Miranda rule. It is fair to conclude
that the Court has led people to think that Miranda is a direction to the police that when
they interrogate a suspect in their custody, they have to deliver the familiar four part
warning. However, now that the Court has made the privilege against self incrimination
conditional, if the public is truly to understand Miranda’s effect on the police, they have
to be aware that Miranda violations don’t occur in the police station but in the courtroom.
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The full implication of the misleading nature of talking about ones Miranda rights was
made clear in a case the Court decided the year after Chavez, Patane v. United States.337
In Patane, the Court refused to apply the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine and
suppress a pistol the police found as a result of interrogating a suspect without giving him
a complete Miranda warning. While conceding that the defendant’s statements were not
admissible at trial as a result of the Miranda violation, the prosecutor did propose to
introduce the pistol into evidence.
Justice Thomas, the author of Chavez, wrote for the plurality decision that held the
introduction of the pistol would not violate the Constitution: “The Miranda rule is not a
code of police conduct, and police do not violate the Constitution (or even the Miranda
rule, for that matter) by mere failures to warn.”338 The statement in the parenthesis is
startling in its implication. It means that even deliberate decisions by the police to
question a suspect without obeying Miranda’s dictate do not, under this view, violate the
Miranda rule. “Potential violations occur, if at all,” Justice Thomas continued in Patane,
“only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial.”339
Now, it would be unrealistic to expect members of the public to understand the debate
over whether Miranda is a prophylactic rule or one that the Constitution directly requires.
But it is certainly fair to conclude that a casual observer of the criminal justice system
would think Miranda means something more than just a direction to the prosecutor about
when the state may admit statements that resulted from custodial interrogation.
Consider how this will appear to a someone taken into police custody who has a
layman’s familiarity with the Miranda warnings. It is unlikely that he will know that
Patane has given the police the imprimatur to ignore Miranda. According to Patane,
police can question a suspect without giving him a Miranda warning, and presumably
they are just as free to question someone who has received one but who says that he
wants to assert his right to remain silent or right to have a lawyer present.
How would we expect a conscientious police officer to react if a suspect sought to end
an interrogation by asserting what we now know is inaccurately called one’s Miranda
rights? Since continuing the interrogation violates neither the Constitution nor the
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Miranda rule, it would be foolish to stop. Stopping ensures the police end up with
neither a statement nor a lead to any physical evidence. So, the reasonable, and
legitimate, thing to do is to continue.
Well, to a suspect who is not versed in the conditional nature of Miranda, it can only
appear that the police who control the environment in which he finds himself, are lawless.
The police will know that they are staying within the limits of a conditional rule. The
suspect almost certainly will not. One may defend this “acoustic separation”340 on the
ground that it is socially desirable for police to gain access to physical evidence that a
suspect has committed a crime. But, it can only be gained at the cost of deception. It
says something about our system of criminal justice if a doctrine describing the rights of
individuals is designed to be effective by hiding from those whom it is supposed to
protect, the true dimension of the protection.
Conditional rules can be misleading not just for outsiders, but for insiders also.
Criminal trial lawyers talk about Brady material prior to trial, when the concept must act
as a guide to what the prosecutor must actually do, without realizing that until the trial is
over, in a strictly accurate sense there is no such thing. As a result, a prosecutor may
deny having Brady material despite knowing that the state has in its possession
information that is exculpatory on its face, so long as the prosecutor does not believe that
the information would be significant enough in the overall context of the evidence to
affect the result. This may seem to be a metaphysical distinction that only the
congenitally hyper-technical or deceptive may use. But it is a perfectly legitimate way to
translate the Court’s doctrine into practical terms. At least, that is what Justices Thomas
and Scalia would have us believe, from their dissent in Banks v. Dretke.341
One of the questions the Court had to resolve in Banks was whether the defendant had
sufficient cause to excuse his failure to present his Brady claim to the state courts. Banks’
ability to offer evidence in federal court to support the Brady claim depended on whether
he could establish that the fault for not presenting it to the state courts lay with the state
and not with his laxity or neglect.
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At issue was the prosecutor’s failure to turn over to Banks prior to trial information
that one of the state’s key witnesses was not only a paid police informant but had
encouraged, at the behest of his police masters, a course of action that the prosecutor
relied on in the penalty phase of the trial to convince the jury to sentence Banks to die. In
his state collateral attack on his conviction, Banks alleged “‘upon information and belief’
that ‘the prosecution knowingly failed to turn over exculpatory evidence as required by
Brady.’”342 The state explicitly denied this claim and as a result, Banks never pursued the
investigation in this stage of the case that later on led him to discover the facts about the
witness’ relationship to the police.
The majority found that the prosecutor’s deceptive answer to Banks’ allegation in his
state collateral attack was among the factors supporting their conclusion that he
established cause for failing to present the new evidence that he wanted the federal court
to consider. Justice Thomas, on the other hand, was far more willing to assume a
semantically fastidious prosecutor than was the majority:
the State could have been denying only that it had failed to turn over evidence in
violation of Brady, i.e., that any evidence the prosecution did not turn over was
not material (a position advanced by the State throughout the federal habeas
process) . . . “[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the
nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the
suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict”343
Lawyers, like laymen, have to learn to think about rules like Miranda and Brady in
conditional terms.
There is another way in which the conditional nature of a rule contributes to confusion.
Greer v. Miller 344 illustrates the problem. Greer was the case that held a prosecutor does
not violate a defendant’s rights simply by asking a question on cross examination about
whether the defendant remained silent after receiving a Miranda warning, so long as the
defendant does not react by supplying the answer. The Court held that this behavior did
not violate the rule it had earlier announced in Doyle v. Ohio.345 Doyle was based on a
conclusion that it was fundamentally unfair to use as evidence a defendant’s invited

342

See id. at 682.
See id. at 710 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
344
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987).
345
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
343

Conditional Rules

89

silence after a Miranda warning, in part because the defendant’s failure to talk to the
police was too ambiguous to serve as reliable proof of guilt.
After Greer disposed of the claim based on Doyle, it went on to consider whether,
despite the fact that the prosecutor never violated the Doyle rule because the defendant
never answered the question, the prosecutor’s behavior nevertheless “so infec[ted] the
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”346 As
examples of such cases, the Court cited Agurs,347 as well as Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo,348 a case in which the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury in his final
argument to convey the false impression that the defendant had unsuccessfully tried to
plead guilty to a lesser charge.349 In considering this question, the Court posed the
problem this way:
Although the prosecutor’s question did not constitute a Doyle violation, the fact
remains that the prosecutor attempted to violate the rule of Doyle by asking an
improper question in the presence of the jury.350
Consider, for a minute, exactly what the Court is saying the prosecutor did that
potentially is so unfair that it might conceivably have tainted the trial. Why, the Court
tells us, the prosecutor “attempted to violate the rule of Doyle.” It is, however, a little
disingenuous to talk about the prosecutor’s action as an attempted Doyle violation.
Prosecutors, by themselves, do not have the ability to violate Doyle. Violations only
occur when the witness answers the prosecutor’s question and the judge allows the jury to
consider the answer as part of the evidence. It’s a little like charging someone with an
attempt to commit a conspiracy. Such behavior may constitute a completely separate
wrong, like solicitation, but it requires some category bending to fit it into the contours of
an attempt.351
If the label of “attempted Doyle violation” isn’t quite accurate, it does serve a purpose.
It makes one think that the Court vigilantly disapproves of what the prosecutor did, while
communicating, with a wink to those in the know, that not only will no one do anything
346
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about it if either the judge or the defense attorney step in to prevent the tainted answer
from appearing but that simply asking the question does not, by itself, violate the
defendant’s constitutional rights or any rule limiting the prosecutor’s power.
iv. The Problem of Prejudice
There are two additional objections unique to all of the conditional rules that rely on
prejudice as the consequence that identifies a violation of the Constitution. For one thing,
the Court has been remarkably inconsistent in deciding when prejudice is a component of
an underlying constitutional right. For another, they ignore all of the instrumental values
inherent in the Constitution, shunning them in favor of accuracy.
a. Inconsistency
In the first conditional rule case, Snyder v. Massachusetts,352 the Court explained that
where a rule is neither explicitly mentioned in the Constitution nor obviously
fundamental, one can only define the rule in situational terms by looking at the overall
fairness of the entire proceedings.353 This rationale, however, has hardly led to coherent
results.
The Supreme Court has found in the Due Process Clause a wide variety of
freestanding rules, not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, that are not conditional.
Due process is the basis for a rule that bans the introduction of evidence that the
defendant was silent after receiving a Miranda warning,354 prohibits a jury instruction
that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant,355 requires the application of the standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,356 bars the use of coerced confessions as evidence,357
352
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mandates that judges first determine the question of a confession’s voluntariness,358
requires judges to be impartial,359 insists that discovery in criminal cases be reciprocal if
the defendant has to reveal information to the prosecution,360 and prevents judges from
intimidating witnesses.361 None of these rules incorporate a showing of prejudice.
Indeed, in none of these cases was there even a discussion about this issue, much less a
convincing rationale for why cases are sorted into one category or another.362
One can see the malleability of the criteria a Justice can use to determine whether a
rule requires a prejudice component or not by looking at the dilemma Justice Scalia faced
in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez.363 The issue in Gonzalez-Lopez was whether a
defendant who claimed he had been denied the right to have counsel of his own choosing
appear for the defense also had to show prejudice. The defendant in Gonzalez-Lopez had
the money to hire his own lawyer, but the trial judge improperly refused to allow the
lawyer to appear pro hac vice, forcing the defendant to hire a local lawyer to represent
him.
The government’s brief in the Supreme Court argued that a “defendant who claims
that he was improperly deprived of counsel of choice must establish prejudice in order to
overturn his conviction.”364 In supporting this contention, the brief quoted from one of
Justice Scalia’s opinions: “defects in assistance [of counsel] that have no probable effect
upon the trial's outcome do not establish a constitutional violation.”365
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Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in Gonzalez-Lopez rejecting the argument that this
part of the right to counsel had a prejudice component: “the right at stake here is the right
to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the
deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of prejudice is required to
make the violation ‘complete.’366
One might well ask why this is so. If the violation of the Sixth Amendment is
complete when a judge prevents a defendant’s attorney of choice from appearing at trial,
why is that in the Sixth Amendment contexts that Strickland and Mickens present the
violation is not complete until all of the evidence is in and prejudice rears its ugly head?
After all, the right to counsel, unlike the rule announced in Snyder, is explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution.367
Justice Scalia’s explanation was to find a new way to characterize the Sixth
Amendment’s concern for the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland and Mickens, he
said, were both derived from a due process case, McMann v. Richardson,368 which first
articulated the proposition that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance
of counsel.”369 McMann dealt with the validity of a guilty plea in the face of a contention
by the defendant that the procedure the trial court used at the time to determine the
voluntariness of a confession had subsequently declared unconstitutional.370 McMann
held that so long as the defendant had been represented by a lawyer who was reasonably
effective in evaluating the admissibility of the confession.371 Having traced the first
concern with the quality of a lawyer’s performance to a due process case dealing with the
validity of a guilty plea, Justice Scalia went on to try to show its relevance for a Sixth
Amendment case about the right to an attorney of ones choice:

366

See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146.
In another case based on a specific provision of the Constitution, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673
(1986), the Court rejected the government’s argument that there should be a prejudice component to the
rule of the Confrontation Clause that a judge must allow the defendant to cross examine a prosecution
witness for bias. The Court’s explanation was that the focus of the Confrontation Clause was “on
individual witnesses” rather than the fairness of the trial as a whole. See id. at 679-80 (“It would be a
contradiction in terms to conclude that a defendant denied any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him nonetheless had been afforded his right to “[confrontation]” because use of that right would not
have affected the jury's verdict.”)
368
397 U.S. 759 (1970).
369
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147 quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771, n. 14.
370
See McMann, 397 U.S. at 766.
371
See id. at 771 n. 14.
367

Conditional Rules

93

Having derived the right to effective representation from the purpose of ensuring
a fair trial, we have, logically enough, also derived the limits of that right from
that same purpose. The requirement that a defendant show prejudice in effective
representation cases arises from the very nature of the specific element of the
right to counsel at issue there -- effective (not mistake-free) representation.
Counsel cannot be “ineffective” unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or,
at least, unless it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective representation is not “complete” until the defendant
is prejudiced.372
The rabbit pulled from the hat in this explanation is the very second word: “derived.”
If “derived” means the Sixth Amendment doctrine depends for its legitimacy on the
earlier recognition of the due process principle, then it makes sense that the limits placed
on the latter apply as well to the former. But the Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel exists quite independently of the Due Process Clause. It isn’t so
much “derived” from the latter as it is “suggested by” it. That being so, there is no reason
why the due process necessity of including a prejudice component must be imported into
the Sixth Amendment’s specific provision of the guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel. The values that underlie the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel exist quite apart from the due process concerns that underlie the
limits that surround a defendant’s ability to attack a guilty plea conviction.
The end result of Justice Scalia’s peregrination seems to boil down to something like
this. Requiring a defendant with money to sit through a trial where her lawyer performed
magnificently infringes a Sixth Amendment value if the lawyer is not the one whom she
would have hired except for the court’s erroneous disqualification. But, requiring an
indigent defendant to sit through a trial where a lawyer appointed by the court performs
so poorly that it violates all professional standards, does not offend the Sixth Amendment
unless some other lawyer would have not only performed in a professionally competent
way but likely would have gotten a more favorable result.
b. Narrow Focus
The conditional rules that rely on prejudice are narrowly focused on protecting only
one of the possible values that the underlying provision might serve. They each
presuppose the sole reason served by the rule is its effect in assisting the trial process
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accurately to identify those individuals who committed the crimes with which they are
charged. Nothing else seems to matter.
There is no denying the importance of accuracy in the criminal trial process. But the
single minded focus on accuracy of a conditional rule relying on prejudice denigrates
other values that one might find implicated in the underlying constitutional provision.373
This is a theme that was sounded by the dissent in the very first conditional rule case,
Snyder.374 Justice Roberts wrote for the four members of the Court who opposed making
the rule governing the presence of a defendant at a view conditional:
where the conduct of a trial is involved, the guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not that a just result shall have been obtained, but that the result,
whatever it be, shall be reached in a fair way. Procedural due process has to do with
the manner of the trial; dictates that in the conduct of judicial inquiry certain
fundamental rules of fairness be observed; forbids the disregard of those rules, and
is not satisfied, though the result is just, if the hearing was unfair.375
Fairness for its own sake, without regard for the degree of fit between the end result
and empirical truth, not only evinces respect for the individual dignity of the defendants
whom the state proposes to deprive of life or liberty. It stands as a beacon of the state’s
commitment to a certain standard of behavior. Where the reality as well as the perception
of such a commitment prevails, the system can command a sense of legitimacy from the
community that is not otherwise obtainable.376
Of course, an appellate court can preserve the value of accuracy without making a rule
conditional, by taking advantage of the harmless error doctrine. However, by resolving a
case on the basis of a conditional rule that incorporates a prejudice requirement, the Court
renders the harmless error doctrine irrelevant. In any case where prejudice exists as part
of the rule, a determination that the rule was violated will by necessity meet the less
stringent harmless error test. Aside from the standard used to determine the effect on the
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outcome, the fundamental difference between a conditional rule and the harmless error
test is the allocation of the burden of proof. When the prejudice inquiry is built into the
definition of the rule, the defendant bears the burden of proof on the issue.377 If the rule
were not conditional, and a court looked at the question of prejudice as part of a harmless
error analysis, then the prosecutor would have to establish that the verdict would not have
been different.378 Relieving the prosecutor of the burden will often foreordain the result
of the case.379 Using a conditional rule that incorporates prejudice is a way for a court to
be able to affirm more convictions than would be possible under a harmless error
regime.380
B. The Case For Conditional Rules
If conditional rules have such serious drawbacks as means of social control,
institutional reform and public understanding, what explains their prevalence across such
a wide range of constitutional provisions? To answer that question, let’s try to identify
the conditions under which it would make sense to craft a rule in conditional format.
First, focus on the predicate behavior that triggers the rule. If you view the behavior
by itself as either benign or even socially useful, but want to control it only in the event
that it causes some easily identified adverse consequence, then it would make sense to
make the rule conditional. Another aspect of the predicate behavior that would make a
conditional rule attractive is if you can’t identify with any degree of precision what it is
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about the behavior that you object to but you can identify the consequence that you want
to avoid. And, you would prefer a conditional rule is if there is some unwanted collateral
consequence, like civil liability or the imposition of an unbearable drain on existing
resources, which would be associated with the predicate behavior if it were not subject to
a conditional rule.
Next, think about the future consequences that complete the violation. The easier it is
for the actors subject to the rule and the people whom the rule is intended to protect to
identify situations in advance when these consequences will occur, the more attractive a
conditional rule will be. And, the more sure you are that the only reason to condemn the
predicate behavior is because it results in the future consequence, the better fit you’ll
have with a rule in conditional format.
And last, since the context in which we are considering conditional rules is that of
constitutional interpretation, the language of the Constitution may compel the choice of a
conditional rule.
i. The Utility of the Underlying Behavior
Estelle v. Williams,381 the prison clothes case, California v. Hodari D.,382 the Fourth
Amendment seizure case, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,383 the compulsory process
case, and Weatherford v. Bursey,384 the intrusion on the attorney client relationship case,
all share one feature. In each, the rule that governed the underlying predicate behavior
was one that the Court undoubtedly saw as having the potential to prohibit behavior that
the Court thought socially useful. Thus, Estelle made the assumption that many
defendants prefer to appear in court in prison clothes in order to garner the jury’s
sympathy.385 In Hodari D., Justice Scalia editorialized on how beneficial it was to an
orderly society for everyone to cooperate with a police officer’s direction to stop.386 In
Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court stressed the obligation of the executive to control illegal
immigration and pointed out that prompt deportation is often the most effective means of

381

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
383
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
384
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
385
See Estelle, 425 U.S. at 508.
386
See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627.
382

Conditional Rules

97

securing the border.387 And in Weatherford, the Court “recognized the unfortunate
necessity of undercover work and the value it often is to effective law enforcement. We
have also recognized the desirability and legality of continued secrecy even after
arrest.”388
In each case, making the rule conditional has the effect of not so subtly encouraging
the underlying conduct by sanctioning it so long as the future action that makes it
unconstitutional never comes to pass.
ii. A Reluctance to Specify Rules of Behavior
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The psychologist Abraham Maslow is credited as the source of the insight that if the
only tool you have is a hammer, it is very attractive to view every problem you come
across as a nail.389 Well, if your whole institutional perspective is to evaluate a process
after all of the relevant events have taken place and determine if the result is legitimate or
not, the post hoc perspective that you enjoy may very well color your view of the type of
rule you announce to justify your result.
For the Supreme Court, every problem that comes to it for action presents itself in the
form of a judgment to be affirmed or reversed. The Court could perform that function
without announcing any rules whatsoever. Of course, that would hardly be a responsible
way for the Court to carry out its institutional role of the constitutional interpreter of last
resort. The Court does write opinions that explain the reasoning behind the result.390 But
writing opinions sets two tasks before the Court. One is to explain why they reached the
result that they did. The other, and harder task, is to explain to those who look to the
Court for guidance how to avoid the problem in the future. That requires the Court to
know more about the job of being a police officer, prosecutor, defense attorney or trial
judge than the Court may feel comfortable with. And so, it may be attractive to explain
the outcome of a case by applying a conditional rule that frees the Court from the job of
providing any guidance for the future.
In both the ineffective assistance of counsel cases and the exculpatory evidence cases,
the Court’s choice of a conditional rule requiring prejudice is largely a function of the
Court’s reluctance to identify the predicate behavior that would violate the rule.
Strickland v. Washington391 bemoaned the infinite number of circumstances that might
define adequate represenation,392 and United States v. Agurs393 stressed the
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indeterminacy of the standard that prosecutors had to use to evaluate the evidence in their
files.394
By incorporating into the definition of each rule a prejudice component, the Court has
drastically limited the occasions when it would be called upon to make a judgment about
whether the predicate behavior triggered the rule. It can simply deny relief by concluding
that the defendant has not been able to establish prejudice. And even in those cases
where it concludes that the rule has been violated, it does not have to do so by
categorically condemning the predicate behavior. All it need do is to make a contextual
judgment from which it may be difficult to generalize.
iii. Pragmatic Considerations
In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,395 which dealt with the prosecutor’s deporting a
potential defense witness, Chavez v. Martinez,396 the case that held that the privilege
against self incrimination is only relevant at trial, and in Scott v. Illinois,397 the right to
misdemeanor counsel case, the Court explicitly referred to resource constraints as a
reason for choosing a conditional rule.
In Valenzuela-Bernal, the government argued that a non-conditional rule would create
havoc:
Because of budget limitations and the unavailability of adequate detention
facilities, it is simply impossible as a practical matter to prosecute many cases
involving the transportation or harboring of large numbers of illegal aliens, where
all the aliens must be incarcerated for a substantial period of time to avoid
dismissal of the charges, even though the prosecution's case may be
overwhelming. As a consequence, many valid and appropriate prosecutions are
foregone.398
The Court was obviously concerned about this aspect of the case, noting that “the
detention of alien eyewitnesses imposes substantial financial and physical burdens upon
the Government, not to mention the human cost to potential witnesses who are
incarcerated though charged with no crime.”399
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In Chavez, Justices Souter and Breyer, who joined in a concurring opinion supporting
the concept that the privilege against self incrimination establishes a conditional rule,
specifically referred to another kind of resource problem that they saw bound up in the
case before them, the prospect of costly civil litigation:
The most obvious drawback inherent in Martinez’s purely Fifth Amendment
claim to damages is its risk of global application in every instance of interrogation
producing a statement inadmissible under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
principles, or violating one of the complementary rules we have accepted in aid of
the privilege against evidentiary use. If obtaining Martinez’s statement is to be
treated as a stand-alone violation of the privilege subject to compensation, why
should the same not be true whenever the police obtain any involuntary selfincriminating statement, or whenever the government so much as threatens a
penalty in derogation of the right to immunity, or whenever the police fail to
honor Miranda? Martinez offers no limiting principle or reason to foresee a
stopping place short of liability in all such cases.400
And in Scott, the Court was concerned that requiring counsel in misdemeanor cases
pursuant to a non-conditional rule would “impose unpredictable, but necessarily
substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States.”401
Resource constraints of another type may also explain the Court’s decision in Mickens
v. Taylor,402 the case that made the conditional rule for attorney conflict of interest cases
where no one specifically objected to the conflicted lawyer’s representation of the
defendant. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor noted that:
If [the rule] were otherwise, the judge's duty would not be limited to cases where
the attorney is suspected of harboring a conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment
protects the defendant against an ineffective attorney, as well as a conflicted one.
It would be a major departure to say that the trial judge must step in every time
defense counsel appears to be providing ineffective assistance, and indeed, there
is no precedent to support this proposition.403
Given the magnitude of the problem of ineffective lawyers, which would extend not only
to those cases which are tried but also to the vastly larger number that are resolved on the
basis of a guilty plea, it may have been a daunting prospect to require trial judges to
become actively involved in trying to remedy the problem beforehand.
iv. Constitutional Language: The Text Made Me Do It
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If the language of a constitutional provision were worded so that the only thing it did
was to command the government to respond in a certain way if one of its agents
committed a particular act, then it would make sense to construct a conditional rule to
implement it. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has this character: “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”404
The Takings Clause imposes two rules on the government, one of which is nonconditional and one which is conditional. 405 In a non-conditional format, it prohibits the
government from ever taking property for a private purpose.406 However, the
government may seize private property for any public use without restriction, subject to
the future condition that it pay just compensation.407 This second rule is clearly
conditional. It creates a regime where a government official may make the decision
about whether to take a citizen’s property unconcerned with and indeed not authorized to
make payment. Whether the taking violates the Constitution depends on what happens
later on, in the payment stage.408
It is possible to view the Due Process Clause in the same way. Carefully parsing the
phrase “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law”409 might lead one to conclude that it created only a conditional rule that simply
focused on the consequence of government action, but left the government’s agents free
to do what they wished so long as their behavior did not result in the loss of someone’s
life, liberty or property. In fact, such an extreme reductionist view of the Due Process
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Clause is not altogether uncommon. A Second Circuit case, Zahrey v. Coffey,410 is an
illustration.
Zahrey was a § 1983 case against an Assistant United States Attorney who allegedly
conspired to fabricate evidence that he used to prosecute the plaintiff, a police officer, on
conspiracy to commit robbery and other charges.411 The ultimate source of the right the
plaintiff relied on was the Due Process Clause, the basis for the Supreme Court’s cases
holding that a prosecutor may not knowingly use false evidence to obtain a conviction.412
The problem for the plaintiff, though, was that he was not trying to set aside a guilty
verdict, since his trial ended in an acquittal. He was suing for a violation of his civil
rights. But where was the violation if at the end of the trial he walked away a free man?
In answering this question, the Zahrey court reasoned that whatever the Due Process
Clause requires, it does not rise to the level of a constitutional command until someone
loses his or her life, or is incarcerated or fined as a result of what had happened:
The manufacture of false evidence, ‘in and of itself,’ . . . does not impair
anyone’s liberty, and therefore does not impair anyone’s constitutional right. . . .
If, for example, a prosecutor places in evidence testimony known to be perjured
or a trial judge makes a racially disparaging remark about a defendant, no
deprivation of liberty occurs unless and until the jury convicts and the defendant
is sentenced. . . . If the trial was aborted before a verdict, it could be said . . .
that . . . that no constitutional right was violated.413
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Under this view of the Due Process Clause, everything it requires of government officials
is conditional, subject to a defendant losing the trial and eventually suffering a loss of
life, liberty or property.414
Could it be that the Constitution would tolerate a trial process that completely ignored
all of the rules that emanate from the Due Process Clause so long as the result was
something other than a conviction? There is a historical precedent for a system that
comes close to this, trial de novo. In early America, this method of handling minor
criminal cases was a feature of the criminal justice systems in all of the New England
states as well North Carolina.415 It was a way of providing rough justice administered by
a local magistrate, often not formally trained in the law, whose decisions to convict could
be nullified by a defendant’s choice to have a trial de novo in front of a circuit riding
professional judge.416 Trials in the first tier of a de novo system were not expected to
provide all of the trappings of due process. If defendants wanted the panoply of
protections the law provided, they could simply appeal for trial de novo where they
would get all of the formal protection of the law. It was, in essence, a system based on an
idea very similar to the conditional rules that the Zahrey court thought embedded in the
Due Process Clause.
While the analogy to trial de novo is appealing on its face, it ignores history. The
federal system never adopted trial de novo. In fact, a point in controversy over the
ratification of the Constitution was the possibility the anti-federalists raised that Article
III’s grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court might allow it to hold a trial de
novo in criminal cases.417 Even more telling is the way that the Court has dealt with
arguments over the years that constitutional limitations do not apply in the first tier of a
system of trial de novo simply because the state eventually offers the defendant a trial
that contains the protection missing from the original proceeding. In the 19th century,
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Callan v. Wilson418 considered whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury
applied to the first tier of the trial de novo system in the local courts of the District of
Columbia. The government argued that so long as the defendant was given free access to
a jury in the second stage of the de novo process, the District was free to shape the first
tier trial free of this particular constitutional restraint. The Court rejected the argument
out of hand.419
Callan, of course, did not rest on the Due Process Clause. Therefore, its rejection of a
conditional interpretation of the right to a jury does not directly address the point on
which the Zahrey court rested its view: the fact that the language of the Clause
specifically refers to deprivations of life, liberty and property rather than to the means by
which the state might accomplish those ends. However, the Court revisited this issue
under the rubric of the Due Process Clause in Ward v. Village of Monroeville.420 Ward
dealt with whether the village mayor could act as the judge in the local criminal court in
light of the fact that the fines the court collected formed a major part of the village’s
income. Whatever restrictions the Constitution placed on the use of a judge with a stake
in the outcome of a criminal case stem directly from the Due Process Clause.421 The
government raised the same argument as in Callan, that the prospect of a trial de novo in
front of an impartial judge was sufficient to meet the demands of the Constitution.422 The
Court again summarily rejected the suggestion: “[The] State’s trial court procedure [is
not] constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an

418

127 U.S. 540 (1888).
See id. at 556 (“[A] judgment of conviction, not based upon a verdict of guilty by a jury, is void. To
accord to the accused a right to be tried by a jury, in an appellate court, after he has been once fully tried
otherwise than by a jury, in the court of original jurisdiction, and sentenced to pay a fine or be imprisoned
for not paying it, does not satisfy the requirements of the Constitution.”). Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427
U.S. 618 (1976) upheld the Massachusetts trial de novo system against a similar claim, but left Callan in
place for two reasons. The first was because the right to a jury in federal court had a basis in Article III,
which did not apply to the states, as well in the Sixth Amendment. The second was because the
Massachusetts system allowed a defendant to circumvent the first trial by admitting to sufficient facts to
support a guilty finding. See id. at 630.
420
409 U.S. 57 (1972).
421
See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (It is a violation of due process for judge to have a financial
stake in the outcome of the trial.)
422
See Brief for Respondent at 14, Ward v. City of Monroeville, 1972 WL 136240 (“Respondent Village of
Monroeville respectfully submits that the existing right to a trial de novo in a county court or a municipal
court is a sufficient fair trial guarantee for any defendant who believes that his individual case was not
fairly tried in mayor’s court.”)
419
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impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first
instance.”423
Although these two Supreme Court decisions do not spell out the rationale for
rejecting a conditional view of the constitutional rules that apply to the system of trial de
novo, the results the Court reached fit with the way that the Framers of the Constitution
likely conceived of the nature of the rights they enshrined in the first ten amendments.424
The parts of the Constitution that regulate the criminal justice system were the result of a
deep mistrust of the central government.425 The Bill of Rights was designed to limit the
new federal entity the Constitution created. It was much more congenial to this
objective, and to the notion of rights that was common at the time, for the Constitution to

423

Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62.
In particular, the original understanding of the Due Process Clause was very likely more consistent with
a focus on specific rules that the government had to follow, rather than a contextual assessment of the
fairness of the process after it had concluded. “The gist of the Due Process Clause, as understood at the
founding and since, was to force the Government to follow those common-law procedures traditionally
deemed necessary before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As noted historian Leonard Levy wrote:
The history of due process shows that it did mean trial by jury and many of the other traditional
rights of accused persons that were specified separately in the Bill of Rights. Its framers were in
many respects careless, even haphazard, draftsmen. They enumerated particular rights associated
with due process and then added the due process clause itself, probably as a rhetorical flourish, a
reinforced guarantee, and a genuflection toward traditional usage going back to medieval
reenactments of Magna Carta.
Leonard W. Levy, Judgments: Essays on American Constitutional History 66 (1972).
This view of the Due Process Clause is also consistent with the way the Supreme Court interpreted it in
the first case applying it in the context of the criminal process, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
In Hurtado, the Court had to decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
required the states to initiate criminal proceedings with a grand jury indictment. In the pre-incorporation
era, cases like Hurtado imposed on the states only those rules so fundamental that they represented, in the
words Justice Cardozo first used in Snyder, the “immutable principles of justice.” See Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934). As a result, Hurtado recognized that the Due Process Clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed to the states, imposed the same limitations on the exercise of
government power as did the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which constrains the federal
government.
Although Hurtado concluded that the requirement of a grand jury indictment was not a part of due
process, it did explain something about what the concept meant. It prohibited specific exercises of
government power, not just procedures that in retrospect were not fair: “acts of attainder, bills of pains and
penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to
another, legislative judgments and decrees, and other similar special, partial and arbitrary exertions of
power under the forms of legislation.” Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536. Due process, Hurtado said, “refers to
certain fundamental rights . . . If any of these are disregarded in the proceedings by which a person is
condemned to the loss of life, liberty, or property, then the deprivation has not been by 'due process of
law.’” Id. That is not language describing a generalized guarantee of fairness. It talks of concrete rights.
425
See Leonard W. Levy, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION at 159-62 (1988) (AntiFederalist insistence on a Bill of Rights stemmed from fear that federal government’s power would be used
to invade personal rights).
424
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regulate government behavior rather than simply guard individuals against illegitimate
results. The Anglo-American conception of rights was more concerned with the
limitation of government power rather than vindicating individual injuries: “In the
eighteenth century . . . many authorities would still have held that the primary holders
of rights were not individuals but rather the collective body of the people. The real issue
. . . was to protect the people at large from tyranny.”426
Even under a conception of rights that focuses on the individual, however, the Zahrey
model of due process creates a problem. It essentially treats the Due Process Clause as a
collection of liability rules, allowing government actors, like the village judge in
Monroeville, to ignore the protections the rules announce so long as the government is
willing to pay a price later on, for example by giving the defendant an impartial judge at a
trial de novo. However, a system which essentially allows the government to purchase
the ability to ignore the limits on its exercise of power is fundamentally inconsistent with
the notion of rights designed to secure liberty.427
IV. Conclusion
Until a phenomenon is given a name, it often goes unrecognized and unexamined.428
So it is with conditional rules. Because up to now no one has pointed out the similarity
among cases that announce conditional rules, neither the Court nor commentators have
been able to assess in a systematic way the use of this device.
Taking the conditional rules cases as a whole does not reveal any insight that the Court
has a coherent philosophy of when they are appropriate and when not. This is not
surprising given the failure to recognize what cases as disparate in time and doctrine as
426

Judd Rakove, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 22 (1998).
See e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Judy Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335,
1339-40 (1986) (“If rights entail or secure liberties, then it is hard to see how liability rules protect them. .
. . Because liability rules neither confer nor respect a domain of lawful control . . . the very idea of a
‘liability rule entitlement,’ that is of a right secured by a liability rule, is inconceivable.”); James Boyd
White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1278 n.21 (1983)
(damages for violation of a constitutional right “would be a kind of forced exchange, and however
appropriate that may be in a commercial context where all things are in principle exchangeable, it would be
incompatible with the idea of a right specifically against the government, and with the reasons why such
rights exist.”); Walter F. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1563 (1972) (though liability protection might be appropriate for private law rights, “it is
inconsistent with a constitutional system.”)
428
Cf. Judith Worell, Feminism in Psychology: Revolution or Evolution?, 571 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 183, 189 (2000) (giving a label to date rape and sexual
harassment led to their recognition as a societal problem).
427
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Snyder v. Massachusetts,429 Chavez v. Martinez430 and Estelle v. Williams,431 to choose
just one conditional rule case from each category, all have in common. At times, the
Court adopts a conditional rule without any recognition of what it is doing, such as in
Nelson v. O’Neil.432 And in the eleven cases in which the Court discussed whether to
adopt either an aggregation or liability type conditional rule, it never recognized that it
had chosen a rule that shared its conditional nature with rules stemming from other
provisions in the Constitution.433 It is only in the ten cases where the Court explicitly
considered whether prejudice should be an element of the underlying rule that one finds
any discussion that refers to cases dealing with other parts of the process where there was
a similar question. But even there, the Court has not been consistent in applying the
reason why it says that prejudice must be a component of the rule.434
However, some things do stand out when you consider all the conditional rules cases
together. Conditional rules almost always favor the state over the individual.435 They
429

291 U.S. 97 (1934).
538 U.S. 760 (2004).
431
425 U.S. 501 (1976).
432
402 U.S. 622 (1971). See the discussion at section II-B-iii supra.
433
The only example of the Court recognizing in these eleven cases that it has adopted a conditional rule
elsewhere is in Patane. Patane cites Martinez, a case the Court decided the year before, which also raised
the question of whether the privilege against self incrimination could be the basis for civil liability on the
part of police officers who acted prior to the initiation of a formal criminal case. See United States v.
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004) (recognizing that Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) established
that “a mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's constitutional rights.”)
434
See the discussion at section III-A-iv-a supra.
435
It is not surprising, therefore, that their opponents on the Court come from the Justices who are most
sympathetic to claims based on individual liberties in criminal cases while their supporters come from those
who view state power with a less jaundiced eye. Of the Justices who have sat on five or more cases
presenting an issue of whether to adopt a conditional rule, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens are the
only ones who voted against adopting a conditional rule more than half of the time, while Justices Stewart,
White, and Burger were the most receptive, favoring them in over nine out of ten cases. See appendix B.
The chart below shows how frequently those Justices who sat on at least five cases in which adopting a
conditional rule was discussed in one of the opinions favored the adoption of a conditional rule.
430

Justice
Stewart
White
Burger
Rehnquist
Powell
Scalia
Blackmun
O’Connor
Stevens
Brennan

Total Cases
8
16
12
15
12
7
14
10
15
13

Favored Conditional Rules
100%
94%
92%
87%
83%
81%
79%
70%
40%
36%
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allow state actors to exercise power more freely, make the constitutional basis for
institutional reform harder, and they make it easier to uphold convictions. Conditional
rules also contribute to a lack of clarity and transparency in government. They make it
harder for those who exercise government power to know what they can and cannot do,
remove much of the incentive for them to avoid abusing their power, and they make it
harder for the rest of us to understand when they cross a line drawn by the Constitution.
Other than in some of the more obscure areas in the worlds of regulating soccer,
baseball and football, it is hard to find examples of other regimes where conditional rules
are attractive enough to be worth adopting. Their use in the realm of constitutional
adjudication is not worth the cost they bear.

Marshall

14

27%
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APPENDIX A

There are twenty-one cases in which the Supreme Court has either adopted a conditional
rule or explicitly discussed whether to do so. They are listed here in two fashions. In the
first, they appear in chronological order. After each case is a description of the
conditional rule that the Court adopted or that was discussed in one of the concurring or
dissenting opinions. In the second list, they are grouped according to whether the
conditional rule applicable to the case was a prejudice rule, an aggregation rule or a
liability rule.
1. Chronological List of Conditional Rule Cases
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (excluding the defendant from a view only
violates due process if the defendant was prejudiced)
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (preindictment delay only violates due
process if the defendant was prejudiced)
Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971) (a prosecutor’s introduction into evidence of an
inculpatory statement by a codefendant only violates the Confrontation Clause if the
codefendant does not eventually testify)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (denying a defendant the right to present
exculpatory evidence only violates due process if the defendant was prejudiced)
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (ordering a defendant to appear in front of the
jury wearing distinctive prison clothing only violates due process if the defendant
objects)
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (a prosecutor’s withholding exculpatory
evidence only violates due process if the defendant was prejudiced)
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (a state agent who deliberately overhears a
privileged conversation between a criminal defendant and defense counsel only violates
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel if the prosecutor
eventually learns the content of the conversation)
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial
identification procedure only violates due process if it results in an identification by a
witness who eventually testifies in a criminal trial)
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978) (refusing to appoint a lawyer for an indigent
defendant charged with a misdemeanor only violates the Sixth Amendment if the
defendant is sentenced to a term of incarceration)
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United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (a prosecutor’s deporting a
potential defense witness only violates due process if the defendant was prejudiced)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (a defense attorney’s inadequate
performance only violates the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel if the defendant was prejudiced)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (a prosecutor’s withholding exculpatory
evidence only violates due process if the defendant was prejudiced)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (denying a defendant the opportunity to
cross examine a witness to show bias should only violate the Confrontation Clause if the
defendant was prejudiced)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) (a prosecutor’s asking a defendant on cross
examination if the defendant had remained silent after receiving a Miranda warning only
violates due process if the defendant answers the question)
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (excluding the defendant from a competency
hearing for a prosecution witness only violates due process if the defendant was
prejudiced)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (a prosecutor’s introduction into evidence of a
statement by a codefendant that does not explicitly mention the defendant should violate
the Confrontation Clause if other evidence the prosecutor subsequently introduces
prejudices the defendant by making the statement inculpatory as to the defendant)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (a police officer who tries to restrain a
suspect by a show of force only comes under the restriction of the Fourth Amendment if
the suspect complies)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (even where a defense attorney’s conflict of
interest is apparent to the judge who appoints the attorney to represent the defendant, it
only violates the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to the assistance of counsel if the conflict
affected the attorney’s subsequent performance)
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (a government official who uses compulsion to
extract an incriminating testimonial statement from an individual only violates the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self incrimination if the state eventually uses the
statement in a criminal trial)
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (a government official who uses
compulsion to extract an incriminating testimonial statement from an individual only
violates the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self incrimination if the state eventually
uses the statement in a criminal trial)
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U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, U.S. (2006) (if a judge, without a valid reason, denies the
defendant the right to hire an attorney of the defendant’s choice, it should only violate the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to the assistance of counsel if the defendant was
prejudiced)
2. Conditional Rule Cases By Type of Rule
(i) Prejudice Rules
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002)
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006)
(ii) Aggregation Rules
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003)
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)
(iii) Liability Rules
Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971)
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)
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APPENDIX B
This list indicates the vote of each Justice on every case in which conditional rules were
either adopted or discussed. Opposed means that the justice wrote or joined an opinion
(either a dissent or a concurring opinion) specifically rejecting the use of a conditional
rule, rather than writing or joining a dissenting opinion that reached a result different
from the majority, but on other grounds. Supporting means that the justice either wrote
or joined an opinion (either a majority, concurring or dissenting opinion) specifically
advocating the use of a conditional rule.
For those Justices who participated in five or more cases, the last column indicates the
per centage of these cases in which the Justice opposed the conditional rule.

Name of
Justice
Cardozo
Van Devanter
Hughes
McReynolds
Stone
Roberts
Brandeis
Sutherland
Butler
Scalia

Opposed Conditional
Rule in

White

Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Richardson;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Mickens; GonzalezLopez
Scott; Bagley; Van
Arsdall; Greer;
Stincer; Hodari D.;
Mickens; Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Richardson

Burger

Van Arsdall

Souter
Stevens

Supported Conditional
Rule in
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder

% Favoring
Conditional Rule

Greer; Stincer; Hodari D.;
Mickens; Chavez
Hodari D.; Chavez

81%

Agurs; Bursey; Manson;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Richardson

40%

Marion; Nelson;
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey; Manson;
Scott; Valenzuela-Bernal;
; Strickland; Bagley; Van
Arsdall; Greer; Stincer;
Hodari D.
Marion; Nelson;
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey; Manson;
Scott; Valenzuela-Bernal;

94%

72%
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Stewart

Blackmun

Van Arsdall; Greer;
Richardson

Douglas
Brennan

Donnelly
Estelle; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Bagley; Van
Arsdall; Greer;
Stincer
Estelle; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Bagley;
Van Arsdall; Greer;
Stincer; Hodari D.

Marshall

Black
Harlan
Powell

Van Arsdall;
Richardson

Rehnquist

Van Arsdall;
Richardson

O’Connor

Valenzuela-Bernal;
Van Arsdall;
Richardson
Chavez

Kennedy
Ginsburg
Breyer
Thomas

Mickens; Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Mickens; GonzalezLopez

Strickland; Bagley;
Marion; Nelson;
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey; Manson;
Scott;
Marion; Nelson;
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey; Manson;
Strickland; Bagley;
Stincer; Hodari D.
Marion; Chambers
Marion; Chambers;
Agurs; Strickland;
Richardson

Marion; Chambers;
Agurs; Richardson

0%

79%

36 %

27%

Nelson
Nelson
Chambers; Estelle;
83%
Agurs; Bursey; Manson;
Scott; Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Greer; Stincer
Estelle; Agurs; Bursey;
87%
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Bagley; Greer;
Stincer; Hodari D.;
Mickens; Chavez
Strickland; Bagley; Greer; 70%
Stincer; Hodari D.;
Mickens; Chavez
Hodari D.; Mickens;
Gonzalez-Lopez

Chavez
Mickens; Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
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Alito
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Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez

